People v. Garcia
1984 Cal. App. LEXIS 2469, 205 Cal. Rptr. 722, 159 Cal. App. 3d 781 (1984)
Rule of Law:
Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime requiring the intent to commit a battery (i.e., apply physical force), which does not necessitate an intent to inflict bodily harm. A trial court is not obligated to give a sua sponte instruction on intent merely to distract if the general instructions adequately define the required intent to apply physical force.
Facts:
- After midnight on September 27, 1981, four Fresno police officers responded to a silent alarm at the Fresno Goodwill store.
- Officer Teresa Snapp observed a suspect, later identified as Enriquez, hunched over near the door to the building, which opened into a fenced yard approximately seven and one-half feet high.
- Officer Snapp approached the fence, shone her flashlight on Enriquez, identified herself as a police officer, and instructed him to put his hands up.
- Enriquez's shoulder moved, and Officer Snapp heard and saw an object, later determined to be a tire iron, come over the fence, missing her head by two to three feet and landing about six feet behind her.
- Immediately after throwing the tire iron, Enriquez fled and was subsequently apprehended by other officers along with his juvenile coparticipant, Angel G.
- An examination of the store door revealed that the knob had been forcibly removed and two of three hinge pins had also been removed, with a screwdriver and hammer found nearby.
- Enriquez admitted to Detective Moralez that he knew the Goodwill store was being burglarized and that he was acting as a lookout.
- Enriquez admitted throwing the tire iron, claiming he did so out of panic because someone yelled 'Freeze' and denied knowing Officer Snapp was a police officer, later testifying he threw it to divert attention.
- Enriquez also claimed to have consumed one and a half fifths of Thunderbird wine prior to the burglary, contending he was too drunk to know what he was doing.
Procedural Posture:
- Enriquez was convicted by a jury in a trial court of attempted burglary and assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer.
- Enriquez appealed the judgment of imprisonment to the Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a trial court have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that an intent merely to distract the victim, rather than to apply physical force, negates the general criminal intent required for assault with a deadly weapon, when the general instructions on assault already define the necessary intent as an attempt to apply physical force?
Opinions:
Majority - Andreen, J.
No, a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that an intent merely to distract the victim, rather than to apply physical force, negates the general criminal intent required for assault with a deadly weapon, when the general instructions on assault already adequately define the necessary intent. The court affirmed the conviction, clarifying the intent required for assault with a deadly weapon. Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime, requiring the intent to commit a battery, which includes the 'least touching' and does not require an intent to inflict bodily harm. The court acknowledged that a conviction for assault cannot be based on an intent merely to frighten, as stated in People v. Wolcott. While Enriquez's asserted motive to distract would be relevant if it meant he intended to throw the tire iron in a direction not dangerously near the officer, the trial court's instructions already fully and fairly informed the jury that Enriquez was guilty only if he 'attempted to apply physical force upon the person of another' and had 'general criminal intent...to commit an act, the direct, natural, and probable consequences of which, if successfully completed, would be the application of physical force upon the person of another.' These instructions, by clearly defining the required intent, necessarily excluded a circumstance in which the defendant merely attempted to distract attention without attempting to apply physical force. Therefore, the general principles of law governing the case were sufficiently covered, and no sua sponte duty to provide a more specific instruction on intent to distract existed.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the scope of a trial court's sua sponte instructional duties regarding specific defense theories in general intent crimes. It reaffirms that assault with a deadly weapon requires the general intent to commit a battery—the application of physical force—and not necessarily the intent to inflict bodily injury. The ruling emphasizes that while an intent solely to frighten or distract (without any attempt to apply physical force) is insufficient for assault, the burden is primarily on the defense to request specific clarifying instructions if the standard instructions on the elements of the crime, including the requisite intent, are already clear and comprehensive. This limits the trial court's obligation to anticipate and instruct on every potential nuance of a defense, particularly when the core legal principles are adequately conveyed.
