People v. Foster
457 N.E.2d 405 (1983) 99 Ill. 2d 48 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The Illinois conspiracy statute requires a bilateral agreement, meaning two or more persons must genuinely intend to agree to the commission of an offense. A conspiracy conviction cannot be sustained under a unilateral theory where one of the two alleged conspirators merely feigns agreement.
Facts:
- On September 28, 1981, James Foster approached John Ragsdale in a bar and proposed a plan to rob an elderly man, A.O. Hedrick.
- Ragsdale stated he was interested but did not believe Foster was serious.
- The next day, Foster returned and discussed the robbery plan in detail with Ragsdale.
- Ragsdale decided to feign agreement with Foster's plan in order to gather more information.
- On October 1, Foster asked Ragsdale if he was ready, but Ragsdale stalled by saying he needed to find another accomplice.
- On October 3, Ragsdale informed the police of the planned robbery.
- The following day, when Foster and Ragsdale met at Hedrick's residence to carry out the plan, they were arrested.
Procedural Posture:
- James Foster was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery following a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County.
- Foster appealed his conviction to the Illinois appellate court.
- The appellate court, interpreting the conspiracy statute to require an actual agreement between two persons, reversed Foster's conviction.
- The State, as petitioner, was granted a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does the Illinois conspiracy statute permit a conviction based on a 'unilateral' theory, where only one person genuinely intends to agree to commit an offense, or does it require a 'bilateral' theory, where at least two persons must actually agree?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Underwood
No. The Illinois conspiracy statute encompasses the bilateral theory of conspiracy, requiring a genuine agreement between at least two persons. The court reasoned that although the legislature amended the statute's language from 'two or more persons' to 'a person,' mirroring the Model Penal Code which adopts a unilateral theory, the legislative committee comments failed to mention this 'profound change.' The court found it unlikely the legislature intended such a significant shift in legal doctrine without any explicit commentary. Furthermore, Illinois has a separate solicitation statute that covers most situations a unilateral conspiracy theory would, making the change less necessary. The legislature's inaction following prior appellate court decisions that interpreted the statute as bilateral also suggests agreement with that interpretation. Finally, the court applied the rule of construction that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Illinois's adherence to the traditional, bilateral theory of conspiracy, distinguishing its statutory interpretation from that of other states and the Model Penal Code which favor a unilateral approach. It clarifies that in Illinois, the essence of conspiracy is the actual agreement between coconspirators, not merely the subjective belief of a single defendant that an agreement exists. This holding requires prosecutors to prove a true 'meeting of the minds' and prevents conspiracy charges in situations involving only one culpable actor dealing with a government agent or informant who is feigning agreement; in such cases, a charge of solicitation would be more appropriate.
