The People v. Richard Don Foster
50 Cal. 4th 1301 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior, similar crimes is admissible under Evidence Code § 1101(b) to prove a common plan and intent, even when the defendant disputes their identity as the perpetrator of the charged offenses. The probative value of such evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice under Evidence Code § 352.
Facts:
- On August 24, 1991, Richard Don Foster visited the High Desert Church of Religious Science and identified himself to the minister using the false name 'Martin Jennings'.
- Two days later, on August 26, 1991, Gail Johnson was working alone as a volunteer at the church.
- Johnson was found dead on the floor of the minister's office, having been stabbed at least eight times, with numerous defensive wounds on her hands and arms.
- Her purse was found near her body with its contents spilled out, and her wallet, which typically contained at least $50, was missing.
- Blood found on the purse and at other locations in the church office matched Foster's DNA profile, with a statistical frequency of one in 24 million individuals.
- Johnson's missing wallet and a pair of Rustler brand blue jeans, matching the size and brand Foster wore upon his arrest and stained with blood consistent with Johnson's, were later recovered from a mine shaft Foster was known to use for disposing of items.
- Foster had previously been convicted of two similar crimes: the 1972 robbery and rape of Johnnie C., and the 1982 robbery and assault of Cindy M., both of whom were women working alone in an office.
- An injury on Foster's palm, photographed two weeks after the murder, was consistent with the type of cut a person would receive if their hand slipped while stabbing someone with a knife.
Procedural Posture:
- The People of California charged Richard Don Foster in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County with murder, burglary, and robbery.
- The prosecution filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of Foster's prior crimes against Johnnie C. and Cindy M., which the trial court granted.
- A jury convicted Foster of first degree murder, second degree burglary, and second degree robbery.
- The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary and a robbery.
- The jury also found true a deadly weapon enhancement and that Foster had prior serious felony convictions.
- After a penalty phase trial, the same jury returned a verdict of death.
- The trial court denied Foster's motions for a new trial, to strike the special circumstances, and to modify the penalty.
- The trial court sentenced Foster to death, resulting in an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior, similar crimes to prove intent and a common plan violate Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 when the defendant disputes his identity as the perpetrator of the charged offenses?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C. J.
No, the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior, similar crimes to prove intent and a common plan does not violate Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, even when the defendant disputes his identity as the perpetrator. The court reasoned that the prior offenses and the charged crimes shared a pattern of the defendant visiting an office, determining a woman was alone, returning to rob her, moving her to a more remote area, and violently attacking her when she resisted. This 'concurrence of common features' was sufficient to support an inference of a common plan and intent under the standard established in People v. Ewoldt. The court rejected the argument that because the prior crimes involved sexual assault and the current one ended in death, they were fundamentally dissimilar, finding the pattern of robbery and violent confrontation to be the key similarity. Furthermore, the court found the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, as the prior crimes were less inflammatory than the charged murder, and the jury was given a limiting instruction (CALJIC No. 2.50) on its proper use. Finally, the court held that any error in instructing the jury that the evidence could also be used to prove identity was harmless in light of the overwhelming independent evidence of Foster's identity, including DNA evidence, the discovery of the victim's property in a location tied to Foster, and Foster's inconsistent testimony.
Analysis:
This case strongly affirms the use of prior bad acts evidence under Evidence Code § 1101(b) to establish intent and common plan, even in the face of a mistaken identity defense. The court's decision clarifies that such evidence does not become inadmissible simply because the defendant disputes his presence at the scene; the similarities between the acts can still be used to prove the perpetrator's mental state and scheme. This holding solidifies a significant tool for prosecutors, allowing them to introduce powerful, and potentially prejudicial, evidence of a defendant's past to illuminate their actions in the present case. The analysis also demonstrates the resilience of a conviction on appeal when supported by overwhelming independent evidence, as the court found any potential instructional error regarding the use of prior acts for identity to be harmless.
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