People v. Feingold
7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
The element of "depraved indifference to human life" in a criminal statute is a culpable mental state (mens rea) requiring proof that the defendant possessed an utter disregard for the value of human life. A conviction for a depraved indifference crime cannot be sustained if the factfinder explicitly determines that the defendant did not possess this mental state.
Facts:
- In February 2003, the defendant, an attorney named Feingold, lived in a 12th-floor Manhattan apartment.
- Feingold attempted to commit suicide by sealing his apartment door with tape, blowing out the pilot lights on his stove, and turning on the gas.
- He then ingested tranquilizers and fell asleep in front of the oven.
- Several hours later, a spark, believed to be from the refrigerator's compressor, ignited the accumulated gas.
- The ignition caused a major explosion that destroyed the walls of Feingold's apartment and heavily damaged several neighboring apartments.
- Feingold survived the explosion, and no one else was seriously injured.
Procedural Posture:
- The People charged Feingold with first-degree reckless endangerment in New York Supreme Court, the state's trial court.
- Following a nonjury trial, the trial judge found Feingold guilty.
- The trial judge stated on the record that Feingold's state of mind was not one of depraved indifference but felt legally bound by the precedent of People v. Register to enter a guilty verdict.
- Feingold was sentenced to five years' probation.
- Feingold, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, granted Feingold leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does the element of "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" in New York's first-degree reckless endangerment statute refer to a culpable mental state (mens rea) of the defendant, rather than an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - G.B. Smith, J.
Yes, 'depraved indifference to human life' is a culpable mental state. The court explicitly overrules its prior precedents in People v. Register and People v. Sanchez, which had treated depraved indifference as an objective assessment of the factual circumstances of the crime. The Court's recent decisions in cases like Hafeez, Gonzalez, Payne, and Suarez have progressively moved away from the Register standard, leading to the conclusion that 'depraved indifference' describes a defendant's subjective state of mind—an 'utter disregard for the value of human life.' Because the trial judge, as the factfinder, explicitly found that the defendant's state of mind was not one of depraved indifference, but rather one of depression and self-focus, the conviction for a crime requiring that mens rea cannot stand. A person cannot be guilty of a depraved indifference crime if the factfinder concludes they were not, in fact, depravedly indifferent.
Dissenting - Ciparick, J.
No, 'depraved indifference' does not require a separate culpable mental state; it is an objective assessment of the factual circumstances of the crime. The majority improperly overrules People v. Register and, to an extent, the very recent People v. Suarez. Under Suarez, depraved indifference reflects 'wickedness, evil or inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts.' Purposefully turning an apartment in a populated building into a bomb is objectively such an act, regardless of the defendant's suicidal state of mind. The trial judge's personal assessment of the defendant's subjective mental state was irrelevant; the judge was bound to apply the law, which objectively defined the defendant's conduct as depravedly indifferent.
Dissenting - Kaye, C.J.
No, 'depraved indifference' is defined by the objective circumstances of the defendant's conduct and does not require a specific mental state beyond recklessness. Overruling Register is an unwarranted and unnecessary step. 'Utter indifference' to human life encompasses situations where a person, through total self-absorption, fails to consider the deadly impact of their actions on others. The defendant's conduct of causing a massive explosion in a densely occupied apartment building squarely evinces an utter disregard for human life. The majority's new rule, requiring proof of a subjective evil mindset, is less workable and will wrongly foreclose prosecutions for quintessential depraved indifference conduct.
Dissenting - Graffeo, J.
No, 'depraved indifference' should be an objective factual assessment, not a subjective mens rea requirement. This dissent states a continued belief that People v. Suarez was wrongly decided and that the majority's decision to overrule Sanchez and redefine 'depraved indifference' is a departure from the statute's language and the Court's prior rationale. Under the Court's established jurisprudence, even as articulated in Suarez, the facts of this case fit the definition of depraved indifference and the conviction should be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision marks a pivotal moment in New York's depraved indifference jurisprudence by explicitly overruling People v. Register and solidifying 'depraved indifference' as a culpable mental state (mens rea). This holding significantly narrows the application of depraved indifference murder and first-degree reckless endangerment, making convictions much more difficult for prosecutors. It resolves the long-standing confusion that led to 'twin-count' indictments for intentional and depraved indifference murder by requiring prosecutors to prove the defendant's subjective mindset was one of 'utter disregard for human life,' rather than just proving the conduct was objectively heinous. This change will likely lead to fewer depraved indifference charges and require a different approach to proving such cases, focusing on circumstantial evidence of the defendant's mental state.
