No. The 'unreasonable self-defense' rule doesn't apply if the threat was completely made up in the defendant's head. That rule is for when you misinterpret a real situation, like thinking a cell phone in someone's hand is a gun. A delusion is different; it's believing in something that has no connection to reality. Arguing you acted because of a delusion is an insanity defense, which must be handled in a separate, second part of a trial after a jury decides if you are guilty.

No, but for a different reason. The main judges are wrong that a delusion can't be used for an 'unreasonable self-defense' claim. If a person truly believes they are in danger, they don't have the 'evil intent' (malice) needed for murder, and it doesn't matter why they believed it. However, the judge was right to reject the defense in this specific case because Elmore didn't offer any real proof that he thought the victim was an immediate threat or that he needed to use deadly force against her.

No, a person can't use the defense of unreasonable self-defense if their belief that they needed to defend themselves was entirely caused by delusions from a mental illness. That kind of belief can only be used as a defense by arguing insanity, which is handled in a separate part of the trial. The court also explained that if someone does a dangerous act on purpose without caring about the risk to others' lives, that counts as the bad intent (called "malice") needed for murder. The reasons for this are: 1) California law says that when someone claims they aren't guilty because of insanity, there's a separate trial to handle that after a jury decides if they are guilty of the crime itself. 2) In the first part of the trial about guilt, the person is assumed to be sane, and evidence of their mental state can't be used to prove insanity. 3) Allowing an argument of self-defense based purely on delusions in the guilt phase would wrongly force the prosecution to prove the person was sane, instead of making the defense prove insanity later.

Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's decision that a killing based on a completely delusional belief in the need for self-defense is murder. She thinks it should be manslaughter because the delusions mean the person didn't have the required "malice" (bad intent) for murder. She argues that the law allows evidence of mental disorders to show if someone actually had malice, no matter where their unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense came from. However, she agrees that in this specific case, the judge was right to not instruct the jury about unreasonable self-defense because there wasn't enough evidence to support that defense.

" `Malice is implied when an unlawful killing results from a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, performed with conscious disregard for that danger

"Two factors may preclude the formation of malice and reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter: heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense."

"Self-defense, when based on a reasonable belief that killing is necessary to avert an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification, and such a killing is not a crime

—defendant who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective circumstances. A delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances. The line between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective correlate. A person who sees a stick and thinks it is a snake is mistaken, but that misinterpretation is not delusional …

" `Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder.'[Citation

"A killing committed when that belief is unreasonable is not justifiable. Nevertheless, `one who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does not harbor malice and commits no greater offense than manslaughter

—the court further developed the concept of imperfect self-defense by explaining "defendants who mistakenly believed that actual circumstances required their defensive act may argue they are guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, even if their reaction was distorted by mental illness. But defendants who contend they killed in self-defense because of a purely delusional …

"Unreasonable self-defense is `not a true defense; rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter

—and quality of the criminal act, or to distinguish right from wrong when the act was committed.[Citations.][¶] A claim of unreasonable self-defense based solely on delusion is quintessentially a claim of insanity under the M'Naghten standard of inability to distinguish right from wrong. Its rationale is that mental illness caused the defendant to perceive an illusory threat, form …

Respondent is correct that evidence of appellant's mental state may not be admitted to prove insanity at the guilt phase

No. The doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is unavailable when the belief in the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional. Unreasonable self-defense is a species of mistake of fact, requiring a defendant's misperception of objective circumstances, not a reaction produced solely by mental disturbance. A purely delusional belief, which is divorced from reality and has no objective correlate, is not a mistake of fact but a hallmark of legal insanity. Under California's bifurcated trial system, a claim of legal insanity must be adjudicated in the sanity phase of the trial, not the guilt phase. Allowing a defendant to argue 'delusional self-defense' during the guilt phase would improperly merge the two phases and contradict the statutory scheme that presumes the defendant is sane during the guilt portion of the trial.

No. While the majority reaches the correct result, its reasoning is flawed because imperfect self-defense should be available even if the belief stems from a delusion. The core of the doctrine is that a genuine belief in the need for self-defense negates the mental state of malice required for murder, regardless of the belief's origin. Penal Code section 28 explicitly allows evidence of mental illness to show the defendant did not harbor malice. However, the instruction was properly denied in this specific case because defendant Elmore failed to produce substantial evidence that he (1) perceived an imminent threat, (2) believed the victim, Suggs, was the source of that threat, or (3) believed deadly force was necessary to defend himself.

No. The doctrine of unreasonable self-defense does not apply when the belief in the need for self-defense arises solely from the defendant's delusional mental state. A purely delusional belief in the need to act in self-defense may be raised as a defense, but that defense is insanity, which is reserved for a separate phase of trial. The court also clarified that malice is implied in unlawful killings that result from a willful act with conscious disregard for human life, and that two factors, heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, may reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that California's statutory scheme sets out a procedure for bifurcated trials when a defendant pleads both not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant is conclusively presumed sane at the guilt phase, and evidence of the defendant's mental state may not be admitted to prove insanity. If the defendant is found guilty, the trial proceeds to the sanity phase where the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Allowing a claim of purely delusional self-defense at the guilt phase would improperly shift the burden to the prosecution to prove the defendant was not insane. The scope of the diminished actuality defense under Penal Code section 28(a) is necessarily limited by the presumption of sanity at the guilt phase.

Disagrees with the majority's conclusion that a killing committed under a delusional belief in the need for self-defense constitutes murder. Argues that such a killing should be considered voluntary manslaughter, as the defendant's delusional state negates the malice required for murder. Kennard contends that under Penal Code section 28(a), evidence of mental disorders is admissible to show whether the defendant actually harbored malice, regardless of the source of the unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. However, Kennard agrees that the trial court properly refused the defendant's request for jury instructions on unreasonable self-defense based on the facts of this case, as the record lacked substantial evidence to support such an instruction.

People v. Elmore

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot