People v. Duty
269 Cal. App. 2d 97, 1969 Cal. App. LEXIS 1622, 74 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
An affirmative falsehood made to a public investigator with the specific intent to shield a perpetrator of a felony from arrest or prosecution constitutes "aiding" a principal felon, thereby satisfying a key element for the crime of being an accessory after the fact.
Facts:
- Barbara Jenner's home in Oroville was seriously damaged by a deliberately set fire in the early morning hours of January 22, 1967.
- Around 2:45 a.m., a neighbor saw Jenner's car in her driveway. About 40 minutes later, an officer saw her car near the scene, loaded with household items, shortly after the fire was discovered.
- Earl Duty and Jenner were together on the night of the fire. They had driven in Duty's car to the Gridley Moose Lodge, leaving Jenner's car parked at the Oroville Inn.
- Jenner testified that she passed out in Duty's car at the Moose Lodge and did not regain consciousness until the next morning.
- Three days after the fire, Duty told a fire marshal and an insurance investigator that he and Jenner had left the Moose Lodge around 2:15 a.m. and driven directly to San Francisco.
- Duty's statement created a false alibi, placing Jenner on the road to San Francisco at the time the fire was set and her car at the Oroville Inn all night.
- Barbara Jenner was subsequently convicted of arson for setting the fire to her home.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Jenner was convicted of the felony of arson in a prior proceeding.
- The State of California charged Earl Duty in a trial court as an accessory to Jenner's arson.
- A jury found Duty guilty as charged.
- Duty appealed the judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third District.
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Issue:
Does providing a deliberately false alibi to law enforcement, with the intent to shield a principal felon from prosecution, constitute 'aiding' the principal under the accessory statute (California Penal Code § 32)?
Opinions:
Majority - Friedman, J.
Yes. An affirmative and deliberate falsehood to public authorities, such as a false alibi, constitutes 'aiding' a principal felon under the accessory statute when it is supplied with the specific intent of shielding them from prosecution and punishment. The court distinguished this from passive non-disclosure, refusal to give information, or denial of knowledge motivated by self-interest. Providing a false alibi is an overt act of assistance intended to help the principal elude punishment. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence—including Duty's companionship with Jenner and the fabrication of a detailed story that contradicted the known facts—that he knew Jenner had committed arson and that he supplied the false alibi with the specific intent to help her avoid arrest and conviction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the meaning of 'aids' within California's accessory statute, establishing that the act of aiding is not limited to physical assistance like hiding a person or evidence. The decision sets a significant precedent that verbal acts, specifically providing a false alibi to investigators, can form the basis of an accessory conviction. This broadens the scope of liability for individuals who try to cover for felons, making it clear that lying to law enforcement to protect a criminal is an affirmative act of assistance that can be prosecuted as a separate felony.
