People v. Dillon

California Supreme Court
34 Cal.3d 441, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (1983)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

While the first-degree felony-murder rule is a valid statutory creation in California, a punishment for this crime violates the state constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment if it is grossly disproportionate to the individual culpability of the offender.

Facts:

Defendant Dillon, a 17-year-old high school student, and two classmates investigated a marijuana farm in the Santa Cruz Mountains but were chased off by armed guards.
Determined to steal the marijuana, Dillon recruited reinforcements and planned a return 'rip-off' operation.
Dillon and his companions armed themselves with shotguns, a baseball bat, and a semi-automatic .22 caliber rifle carried by Dillon.
Upon returning to the farm, the group made their way past barricades and 'no trespassing' signs to encircle the field.
One of Dillon's companions accidentally discharged a shotgun twice, alerting the guards.
An armed guard, Dennis Johnson, approached Dillon's position carrying a shotgun.
Believing Johnson was about to shoot him, Dillon panicked and rapidly fired his rifle nine times, killing Johnson.
Dillon and his companions fled the scene without taking any marijuana.

Procedural Posture:

Defendant was charged in Santa Cruz County Superior Court with first-degree felony murder and attempted robbery.
The jury, after asking if they could return a lesser verdict and being told no by the judge, convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and attempted robbery.
The trial court ordered the defendant committed to the California Youth Authority rather than state prison.
The People appealed the commitment order.
The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate ruling the defendant ineligible for the Youth Authority and directed the trial court to vacate the commitment.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment in state prison.
The defendant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of California.

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Issue:

Is the first-degree felony-murder rule constitutional, and does the mandatory life sentence imposed under it constitute cruel or unusual punishment as applied to an immature 17-year-old defendant who killed a victim in panic during an attempted robbery?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Mosk

Yes, the felony-murder rule is constitutional, but no, the life sentence is not permissible in this specific case because it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. The Court first established that standing crops can be the subject of robbery, rejecting archaic common law distinctions. Regarding felony murder, the Court determined it is a creature of statute (Penal Code § 189) and does not violate due process by presuming malice, because malice is not an element of felony murder; the intent to commit the felony supplies the necessary mens rea. However, under the California Constitution (Art. I, § 17), a punishment may be unconstitutional if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense and the offender's culpability. Applying the 'Lynch' test, the Court found that Dillon was an unusually immature youth with no prior record who killed out of panic rather than malice. The jury and trial judge clearly felt the mandatory first-degree penalty was excessive. Consequently, the judgment was modified to second-degree murder to allow for a punishment that fits the criminal.

Concurring - Justice Reynoso

Yes, I agree with the result reducing the sentence, but I express grave concern regarding the majority's reasoning on the felony-murder rule itself. While the outcome of modifying the judgment is correct based on proportionality, the statutory analysis of felony murder is troubling.

Concurring - Justice Kaus

Yes, the sentence should be reduced, primarily because the jury was effectively coerced into a first-degree verdict against their will. The record shows the jury wanted to avoid the harshness of the felony-murder rule (jury nullification) but was instructed they had no choice. Since the jury practically begged for a way to return a lesser verdict, and the trial court foreclosed that option, the reduction to second-degree murder is the only practical solution.

Concurring - Justice Kingsley

Yes, I concur with the majority, noting that applying the constitutional ban on cruel punishments is not 'ignoring' the law but applying the 'whole' law. This is not jury nullification, but judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.

Concurring - Chief Justice Bird

Yes, the result is correct, but the court should go further and acknowledge that the felony-murder rule itself is likely unconstitutional. The rule punishes accidental or negligent killings as severely as premeditated murder, creating a strict liability crime that conflicts with the constitutional requirement of personal moral culpability (mens rea). While the majority correctly identifies the proportionality problem, the rule itself remains a 'barbaric' anachronism.

Concurring_and_dissenting - Justice Richardson

Yes, the felony-murder rule is valid, but no, the sentence should not be reduced. The defendant planned an armed invasion, laid in wait, and fired nine times at the victim. This was not a mere accident or panic; it was a lethal, calculated act. A sentence of life with the possibility of parole (effectively 7 to 20 years) is not cruel or unusual for such a deliberate killing.

Concurring_and_dissenting - Justice Broussard

Yes, the defendant is guilty of felony murder, but no, the sentence is not disproportionate. The felony-murder rule is likely common law, not statutory, but it is well-established. Regarding punishment, the defendant was the ringleader of an armed robbery and killed a guard; he is as culpable as a typical adult felony-murderer. The refusal to extend lenient treatment to a murderer does not violate the Constitution.

Analysis:

This case is a landmark decision in California law for two reasons. First, it solidified the felony-murder rule as a statutory creation, insulating it from judicial abolition while simultaneously clarifying that malice is not an element of the crime. Second, and more importantly, it established the 'Dillon' power—the authority of the judiciary to reduce a conviction from first-degree to second-degree murder (or lower) if the mandatory penalty for the greater offense would be constitutionally disproportionate to the specific defendant's personal culpability. This introduced an individualized sentencing assessment into the rigid framework of felony murder.

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