People v. Dellinger
783 P.2d 200, 264 Cal. Rptr. 841, 49 Cal. 3d 1212 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The 'wanton disregard for human life' definition of implied malice, as provided in CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 rev.), adequately conveys to the jury that implied malice requires a finding of the defendant’s subjective awareness or appreciation of the life-threatening risk created by their conduct.
Facts:
- On May 29, 1979, two-year-old Jaclyn Z. died at St. Joseph’s Hospital due to a fractured skull and swelling of the brain caused by blunt-force trauma to the head.
- An autopsy revealed cocaine in Jaclyn's blood and liver, and a very large, potentially fatal dose in her stomach, which a forensic pathologist opined was a contributing cause of death.
- Jaclyn lived with her stepfather, Dellinger, and her mother, Dianne; Dellinger told Dianne that Jaclyn had been hurt and he had found her on the middle landing of the stairway after hearing a noise.
- At one point, Dellinger looked at the unconscious child, banged the kitchen counter, and stated in an angry tone, 'Jackie, why are you doing this to me?'; he later admitted to Dianne that he had given Jaclyn some wine in a baby bottle because she was 'fussy.'
- A few days after Jaclyn's death, Dianne discovered all of Jaclyn’s baby bottles were missing, and Dellinger admitted to her that he had thrown them away.
- Approximately one month before Jaclyn's death, her babysitter, Betty Krauss, observed a black-and-blue handprint-shaped bruise on the child’s lower back-upper buttocks area, and Dellinger told Krauss he had 'whipped her and that he had realized in the morning that he had done it much harder than he had anticipated.'
Procedural Posture:
- Dellinger was found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury at his first trial.
- The trial court reduced Dellinger's conviction to second-degree murder.
- An intermediate appellate court (Court of Appeal) reversed that conviction.
- On retrial, a jury convicted Dellinger of second-degree murder.
- An intermediate appellate court (Court of Appeal) reversed this second-degree murder conviction, finding the jury instruction on implied malice confusing.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine the adequacy of the jury instruction.
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Issue:
Does CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 rev.)'s definition of implied malice, which includes the phrase 'wanton disregard for human life,' adequately inform a jury that implied malice requires a finding of the defendant’s subjective awareness or appreciation of the life-threatening risk created by their conduct for a second-degree murder conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Eagelson, J.
Yes, CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 rev.)'s definition of implied malice, which includes the phrase 'wanton disregard for human life,' adequately informs the jury that implied malice requires a finding of the defendant’s subjective awareness or appreciation of the life-threatening risk created by their conduct for a second-degree murder conviction. The court held that implied malice requires a subjective awareness of the risk to human life, as reaffirmed in People v. Watson (1981). It found that the two historical definitions of implied malice—'wanton disregard for human life' (from People v. Thomas, 1953) and 'conscious disregard for life' (from People v. Phillips, 1966)—articulated one and the same standard, as established by Watson. Viewing the 'wanton disregard' definition as a whole, a reasonable juror would understand that acting 'with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life' necessitates knowledge of the life-threatening harm. Dictionary definitions of 'disregard' as intentional or willful lack of attention, and 'wanton' as involving consciousness of conduct and realization of probable injury, support this interpretation. Despite finding no error, the court concluded that the 'wanton disregard for human life' standard has become a superfluous charge by contemporary standards, similar to its previous stance on 'abandoned and malignant heart.' For future practice, the court endorsed the revised CALJIC Nos. 8.11 and 8.31 (5th ed. 1988), which exclusively use the 'conscious disregard for human life' definition, deeming it 'more comprehensible to the average juror.'
Dissenting - Broussard, J.
No, CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 rev.)'s definition of implied malice, which includes the phrase 'wanton disregard for human life,' does not adequately inform a jury that implied malice requires a finding of the defendant’s subjective awareness or appreciation of the life-threatening risk created by their conduct for a second-degree murder conviction. Justice Broussard argued that the instruction must be interpreted as a 'reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction' (Sandstrom v. Montana, 1978), not solely through legal precedent. He contended that the term 'disregard for life' broadly encompasses situations where the risk is not contemplated or appreciated, and 'wanton' does not sufficiently narrow it to subjective awareness. The disjunctive 'or' between the 'wanton disregard' and 'conscious disregard' definitions likely led the jury to believe there were two alternative tests, with only the latter requiring subjective knowledge. Given the conflicting expert evidence, the jury’s lengthy deliberations, and specific request for the instruction, Justice Broussard concluded the error was prejudicial. He suggested the jury might have found Dellinger guilty of murder based on reckless behavior without appreciating the risk, which should have resulted in a manslaughter conviction. He also noted that the prosecutor treated the two definitions as distinct, exacerbating the potential for jury confusion.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the subjective standard required for implied malice in California, affirming that 'wanton disregard' implies subjective awareness of risk. However, the court's strong recommendation for future jury instructions to exclusively use 'conscious disregard for human life' signals a move towards greater linguistic clarity and accessibility in criminal intent instructions. This judicial guidance aims to reduce ambiguity and potential for instructional error in trials, impacting how prosecutors and defense attorneys frame arguments regarding a defendant's mental state and how judges craft jury instructions in second-degree murder cases.
