People v. DeJonge
501 N.W.2d 127, 442 Mich. 266 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Michigan's teacher certification requirement for home schools is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when applied to families whose sincere religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors, as the state's interest in certification is not compelling and the requirement is not the least restrictive means.
Facts:
- Mark and Chris DeJonge taught their two school-age children at home following a program administered by the Church of Christian Liberty and Academy in accordance with their religious faith.
- The DeJonges held a sincere religious conviction that scripture teaches parents are solely responsible to God for their children's education, and that allowing the state to impose certified teachers would be a sin.
- The Church of Christian Liberty and Academy program provided individualized curriculum, testing, and monitoring, and had a history of students successfully graduating and attending major colleges and universities.
- The prosecution did not question the adequacy of the DeJonges' instruction or the quality of the education their children received.
- The trial judge concluded that the DeJonges' opposition to the certification requirement was driven by a "very, very honest and sincere religious conviction."
Procedural Posture:
- The Ottawa Area Intermediate School District charged Mark and Chris DeJonge with violating Michigan's compulsory education law for teaching their children at home without certified teachers.
- The trial court convicted the DeJonges, sentencing them to two years probation, fining them $200 each, and ordering them to arrange for certified instruction.
- The Ottawa Circuit Court affirmed their convictions.
- The DeJonges appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, where their case was consolidated with People v Bennett.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decisions, reaffirming the convictions on rehearing (referred to as DeJonge II).
- The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources v Smith and Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool.
- Following remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals again affirmed the DeJonges’ convictions (referred to as DeJonge III).
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Issue:
Does Michigan's teacher certification requirement for home schools, as applied to families whose sincere religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Riley, J.
Yes, Michigan's teacher certification requirement for home schools is an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to families whose religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors. The Court held that strict scrutiny applies to this "hybrid situation" involving both the Free Exercise Clause and parental rights to direct their children's education, as established in Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources v Smith and Wisconsin v Yoder. Under the compelling interest test, the DeJonges' beliefs were sincerely held and religious in nature, and the certification requirement imposed a substantial burden by coercing them to violate their religious faith. The state failed to demonstrate a truly compelling interest, as its asserted interest was in the manner of education (certification) rather than its general goals, which the DeJonges were already meeting. Crucially, the state provided no evidence that certification was essential or the least restrictive means, especially given that many other states permit home schooling without certified teachers and empirical studies show no clear correlation between certification and educational quality. Alternatives like standardized testing, which the DeJonges did not object to, were available and less burdensome.
Dissenting - Mallett, J.
No, the teacher certification requirement does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The dissent argued that the majority improperly expanded parental rights to direct the secular education of children when coupled with the Free Exercise Clause, beyond what Pierce v Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v Yoder established regarding elimination of choice versus regulation. The state possesses a compelling interest in the universal education of school-age children, and the certification requirement is an effective and appropriate means to ensure that educators possess a minimal level of competency. The dissent disagreed with the majority's strict interpretation of the compelling interest test, arguing that United States v Lee suggested a less burdensome standard than "least restrictive means," and that accommodation of the DeJonges' beliefs would "unduly interfere" with the state's interest. Furthermore, alternatives like standardized testing are inadequate because deficiencies would only be discovered after harm has occurred, and the state is not required to prove a "clear and present danger" for its regulations to stand.
Concurring - Levin, J.
Yes, the convictions should be reversed. Justice Levin concurred with the majority's decision because he agreed that the state failed to demonstrate that the teacher certification requirement was the least intrusive means of fulfilling its interest in ensuring the education of the DeJonge children.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens the protection for religious home schoolers under the Free Exercise Clause, particularly in states with strict teacher certification requirements. By classifying the issue as a "hybrid situation"—where religious freedom intersects with parental rights to direct children's education—the Michigan Supreme Court invoked strict scrutiny, placing a high burden on the state to justify its regulations. The decision highlights that a state's general interest in education is not automatically compelling enough to override sincerely held religious beliefs if less restrictive alternatives exist. This precedent likely influenced other states to adopt more accommodating home schooling laws and provides a framework for challenging educational regulations that directly burden religious practices.
