People v. DeFore
1887 Mich. LEXIS 757, 31 N.W. 585, 64 Mich. 693 (1887)
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Rule of Law:
The crime of seduction requires that the woman voluntarily consents to sexual intercourse in reliance on the man's promise of marriage. If her submission is obtained through force and against her will, the act does not constitute seduction, as the element of consent induced by promise is absent.
Facts:
- Nettie Josephack and the respondent engaged in sexual intercourse on November 16, 1884.
- Josephack testified that the intercourse occurred under a promise of marriage from the respondent.
- Josephack stated that the respondent used considerable force before the act was accomplished.
- In a signed statement, Josephack affirmed, 'I did not consent to his doing that to me, and would not, only he held me so tight I could not help it.'
- Josephack also stated that she would not have pursued legal action against the respondent if she had not become pregnant as a result of the encounter.
- No evidence was presented to challenge Josephack's previous chaste character.
Procedural Posture:
- The respondent was prosecuted by the People for the crime of seduction in a trial court.
- At trial, the respondent's counsel submitted nine written requests for specific jury instructions.
- The trial judge declined to give the requested instructions and instead delivered his own charge to the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict convicting the respondent of seduction.
- The respondent appealed his conviction to the state's highest court, alleging error in the trial court's refusal to give his requested jury instructions and in the charge that was given.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit the crime of seduction if the woman's submission to sexual intercourse is obtained through force, against her will, rather than through her willing consent induced by a promise of marriage?
Opinions:
Majority - Champlin, J.
No. A conviction for seduction cannot be sustained if the sexual act was accomplished by force and against the woman's will, because the offense requires her consent, obtained by means of a promise of marriage. The core of the crime of seduction is enticing a woman from virtue by obtaining her assent to illicit intercourse through promises she relies upon. If a woman resists but ultimately yields because of the promise, the offense is committed. However, if she never assents and the intercourse is achieved through force or compulsion, the act is not seduction. The trial court committed a reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that if they found the act was done against the prosecutrix's will, they could not convict the respondent of seduction. This effectively removed a valid defense theory from the jury's consideration.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the essential elements of the crime of seduction, distinguishing it sharply from both rape and consensual sexual activity. The decision establishes that the woman's consent is a critical element, but this consent must be procured by the specific inducement of a marriage promise. By highlighting that force negates the 'yielding' element of seduction, the ruling prevents prosecutors from charging seduction when the facts might align more closely with rape, a more serious offense. This precedent reinforces the necessity for precise jury instructions that address all material elements of a charged crime and any defense theories supported by the evidence.
