People v. DaCosta
6 N.Y.3d 181, 844 N.E.2d 762, 811 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's conduct is a sufficiently direct cause of death to support a homicide conviction if the death was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's actions, even if the defendant did not directly inflict the fatal injury.
Facts:
- Defendant, wanted on a felony warrant in Maryland, was located in Buffalo, New York by bail bondsmen.
- The bondsmen notified local police, who intercepted a bus the defendant was riding.
- Upon police arrival, defendant disembarked from the bus and began to flee on foot.
- Officer McLellan pursued the defendant, who ran toward the Kensington Expressway, a six-lane highway.
- Defendant crossed the first three lanes of traffic during morning rush hour and scaled a six-foot-tall chain-link fence in the median.
- As Officer McLellan attempted to climb the same fence in pursuit, it bent under his weight, causing him to fall into oncoming traffic.
- Officer McLellan was struck by a car and died from the injuries he sustained.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted defendant on one count of manslaughter in the second degree.
- At trial in County Court, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for insufficient evidence of causation at the close of the prosecution's case; the motion was denied.
- Defendant renewed the motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence, and the court again denied it.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York) granted defendant leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of fleeing from police across a major highway during rush hour constitute a sufficiently direct cause of a pursuing police officer's death when the officer falls from a median fence into oncoming traffic and is fatally struck by a vehicle?
Opinions:
Majority - Graffeo, J.
Yes. The defendant's conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the officer's death to support a conviction for second-degree manslaughter. A defendant's actions can be the legal cause of death when they set in motion a chain of events where the ultimate harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence. Here, the defendant, a fleeing felon, led Officer McLellan onto a major expressway during rush-hour traffic. It was reasonably foreseeable that the officer, in hot pursuit, would also attempt to cross the highway and scale the fence, exposing him to the grave danger of being struck by a vehicle. Citing People v. Matos and People v. Kern, the court held that the defendant's actions created the dangerous circumstances that led directly to the officer's death, making him criminally liable for the foreseeable result.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the legal standard for causation in homicide cases involving police pursuits. It establishes that a fleeing suspect can be held criminally liable for an officer's death even when the death is accidental and not directly inflicted by the suspect. By focusing on the foreseeability of harm resulting from the dangerous situation created by the defendant's flight, the ruling strengthens prosecutors' ability to charge suspects in similar scenarios. The case distinguishes these 'flight' scenarios from more attenuated causation issues in corporate or industrial accident cases, solidifying a specific line of reasoning for deaths occurring during the immediate pursuit of a fleeing felon.
