People v. Cook
228 Cal. App. 2d 716, 39 Cal.Rptr. 802, 1964 Cal. App. LEXIS 1132 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
Consent to take a vehicle, even if induced by fraud or false pretenses, is still considered consent for the purposes of a statute that criminalizes taking a vehicle 'without the consent of the owner.' Such fraudulently induced consent does not satisfy the essential element of nonconsent required for a conviction under Vehicle Code § 10851.
Facts:
- Maron Satchell, a friend of Frank Billy Ray Cook, went to the Frahm Pontiac car dealership to acquire a 1959 Mercury.
- Posing as Cook, Satchell used Cook's name and offered Cook's 1950 Buick as a trade-in on the Mercury.
- Satchell also gave Frahm Pontiac a spurious check for $300 as part of the transaction.
- Frahm Pontiac employees, believing they were making a legitimate sale to Cook, consented to the transaction.
- The dealership voluntarily transferred possession of the Mercury to Satchell and took possession of the Buick as a trade-in.
- Frahm Pontiac then forwarded the necessary paperwork to have the Mercury registered in Frank Cook's name.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Billy Ray Cook was charged by information in a trial court with grand theft auto (Penal Code § 487(3)) and unlawful taking of a vehicle (Vehicle Code § 10851).
- A jury acquitted Cook of grand theft auto but found him guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 10851.
- The trial court denied Cook's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to state prison.
- Cook (appellant) appealed the conviction for violating Vehicle Code § 10851 to the District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a person take a vehicle 'without the consent of the owner' in violation of Vehicle Code § 10851 when the owner's consent to the taking is induced by fraud or false pretenses?
Opinions:
Majority - Burke, P. J.
No. A person does not take a vehicle 'without the consent of the owner' when that consent is obtained through fraud, because fraudulently induced consent is still legally valid consent for the purposes of Vehicle Code § 10851. The court reasoned that § 10851 specifically criminalizes taking a vehicle 'without consent,' which is a distinct element from fraud or false pretense. While other statutes, like Penal Code § 484 (theft by false pretenses), are designed to punish fraudulent acquisitions, § 10851 is not. The court adopted the common law rule and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, such as State v. Boggs, holding that for crimes requiring an absence of consent, consent procured by fraud does not satisfy the element of nonconsent. The court distinguished this case, involving 'fraud in the inducement' where the owner intended to part with the vehicle, from 'fraud in the factum,' where consent might be vitiated because the owner was deceived as to the nature of the transaction itself. Since Cook was acquitted of the grand theft charge, which encompasses fraud, the court held that the fraud could not be used to vitiate the consent that Frahm Pontiac had actually given.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a crucial distinction between different theft-related offenses in California law, specifically between unlawful taking ('joyriding') and theft by false pretenses. It establishes the precedent that prosecutors cannot use evidence of fraud to satisfy the 'without consent' element of Vehicle Code § 10851. This forces prosecutors to charge the correct statutory offense that aligns with the defendant's conduct, ensuring that the specific elements of each crime are strictly proven. The case solidifies the principle that fraudulently induced consent is legally distinct from a complete lack of consent, thereby preventing the blurring of statutory lines between different types of criminal takings.
