People v. Conley
187 Ill.App.3d 234, 543 N.E.2d 138 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
For the purpose of aggravated battery, a 'permanent disability' is an injury where the victim is no longer whole and an injured body part no longer serves the body in the same manner as it did before the injury. The specific intent to cause such a result can be inferred from the circumstances of the attack, including the weapon used and the force of the blow.
Facts:
- Sean O’Connell attended a large high school party where students were drinking beer.
- After a verbal confrontation with one group of boys, O'Connell and his friends decided to leave the party.
- While walking to their car, they were approached by another group.
- An individual from this new group demanded a can of beer from O'Connell's friend, Marty Carroll.
- When Carroll refused, the individual, identified at trial as William J. Conley, struck O’Connell in the face with a wine bottle.
- O’Connell suffered broken upper and lower jaws, four broken facial bones, and the loss of one tooth.
- As a result of the attack, O’Connell sustained permanent partial numbness in one lip and a condition called mucosal mouth.
- Medical experts testified that the life expectancy of ten of O'Connell's damaged teeth might be diminished by a third or a half.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Illinois charged William J. Conley in a state trial court with two counts of aggravated battery: one for causing great bodily harm and one for causing permanent disability.
- After a trial, a jury found Conley guilty of aggravated battery based on permanent disability.
- The jury returned no verdict on the count of great bodily harm, which the court treated as an acquittal on that charge.
- Conley filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court sentenced Conley to 30 months' probation, which included 40 days of periodic imprisonment.
- Conley, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.
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Issue:
Does an injury that results in permanent partial numbness, the loss of a tooth, and other permanent dental damage, but not a loss of ability to perform specific tasks, constitute a 'permanent disability' under the Illinois aggravated battery statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cerda
Yes, such an injury constitutes a 'permanent disability' under the Illinois aggravated battery statute. The court, addressing a question of first impression, held that the definition of 'permanent disability' does not require a showing that the victim is unable to perform certain tasks. Instead, drawing from the historical context of mayhem law which evolved to protect the 'integrity of his person,' the court established that an injury is disabling if the victim is 'no longer whole' and the injured body part 'no longer serves the body in the same manner as it did before the injury.' O'Connell's lost tooth and permanent partial numbness meet this standard. Furthermore, the court found that the specific intent to cause a permanent disability can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such as Conley's act of striking O'Connell in the face with a bottle.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the legal definition of 'permanent disability' for aggravated battery in Illinois, shifting the focus from functional impairment to the permanent alteration of the body's integrity. By establishing that an injury need not cause an 'inability to do something' to qualify, the court lowered the threshold for prosecutors to prove this element of the offense. This precedent makes it easier to secure aggravated battery convictions for injuries like severe scarring, nerve damage, or loss of teeth, which are permanent but might not prevent a victim from performing daily life activities. The opinion also reaffirms the principle that specific intent for a particular harm can be inferred from the nature and violence of the act itself.
