No. A judge can't force the defense team to share its private notes. Creating rules about what evidence each side has to share is a job for lawmakers (the Legislature), not for judges. This is a very complicated issue that involves many constitutional rights, so it's better to have a clear, written law for everyone to follow. Even though the judge made a mistake here, it didn't really affect the outcome of the case, so Collie's main convictions still stand.

No. I agree with the final decision, but I'm more optimistic than the main opinion. I think lawmakers probably *can* write a fair rule about this if they try.

No. I agree with the final result, but not the reasoning. The main opinion is wrong to say judges can't handle this. Courts have always had the power to make rules for trials to make sure they are fair and find the truth. The court is just avoiding its responsibility. The notes didn't prove the defendant was guilty, so sharing them was harmless and should have been allowed to help the jury see if the alibi witness was telling the truth.

Yes, it's against the defendant's rights. The judge shouldn't have let the prosecutors get the witness's earlier statement, because it goes against the defendant's constitutional protections. It's not the court's job to make rules that limit these rights without the legislature's clear approval. The complicated constitutional issues and lack of guidance from lawmakers means courts have to refuse any forced sharing of defense evidence. Letting prosecutors have the evidence didn't actually hurt Collie's case much, except for the attempted murder charge for his daughter, which has to be reversed because of a mistake in the jury instructions. The court also said judges don't have to explain to juries how to consider evidence of past crimes unless it's a really big and unfair part of the case against the defendant.

Justice Newman agreed with the decision, but didn't share the majority's strong doubts that a fair rule allowing prosecutorial discovery could ever be made.

Justice Richardson agreed with the result but disagreed with the majority completely banning prosecutorial discovery unless the legislature acts. He thought this was the court giving up its duty to figure out constitutional issues and its power to create fair discovery rules. Richardson believed the majority exaggerated how hard it is to make rules that are constitutional, since federal courts have done it, and that banning all prosecutorial discovery even when it wouldn't actually incriminate the defendant was unnecessary and unfair.

—in the "occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence... is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose."

—the trial court is under no duty to instruct sua sponte on the limited admissibility of evidence of past criminal conduct

"[A] lthough a court should give a limiting instruction on request, it has no sua sponte duty to give one

"Although we refrain from establishing discovery rules related to testimonial evidence, we leave intact the firmly established precedents that hold the self-incrimination privilege inapplicable to, and allow mandatory production of, nontestimonial evidence such as fingerprints, blood samples, breath samples, appearances in lineups, and handwriting and voice exemplars."

Our California Supreme Court has further stated, "Neither precedent nor policy favors a rule that would saddle the trial court with the duty either to interrupt the testimony sua sponte to admonish the jury whenever a witness implicates the defendant in another offense, or to review the entire record at trial's end in search of such testimony. There may be an occasional …

For example, the Court of Appeal was concerned that Zonen's disclosure of his case file might have waived prosecutorial work product privileges that would otherwise attach

—work-product doctrine "manifestly... cannot be invoked by the prosecution to preclude discovery by the defense of material evidence, or to lessen the state's obligation to reveal material evidence even in the absence of a request therefor

No. A trial court lacks the authority to compel the production of defense evidence for prosecutorial discovery absent explicit legislative authorization. The creation of such procedural rules, which involve a complex interplay of state and federal constitutional rights, is a function better left to the Legislature rather than the judiciary. This court disapproves of judicial attempts to frame prosecutorial discovery orders, following the principle of judicial restraint articulated in Reynolds v. Superior Court. While prosecutorial discovery of third-party witness statements does not violate the federal Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, it raises serious issues under the California Constitution, the right to counsel, due process reciprocity requirements, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doctrine. Given these complexities, the judiciary should refrain from piecemeal rulemaking and instead review comprehensive legislative solutions if and when they are enacted. Although the discovery order here was erroneous, the error was harmless as the impeachment of the witness did not deprive the defendant of a meritorious defense.

No. While concurring with the judgment, this opinion disagrees with the majority's expression of 'grave doubts that a valid discovery rule affecting criminal defendants can be devised.' The legislature may be capable of creating a constitutionally valid prosecutorial discovery rule.

No. Concurring in the judgment only, this opinion dissents from the majority's reasoning, arguing it is an unprecedented abdication of the court's judicial responsibility to resolve constitutional issues and develop fair discovery procedures. Courts have the inherent power to develop rules to aid in the truth-seeking function of a trial, as established in Jones v. Superior Court. The Prudhomme standard, which permits discovery that poses no substantial hazard of self-incrimination, is workable and was satisfied in this case. By prohibiting all judicially-ordered prosecutorial discovery, the majority overstates the complexity of the issue and unnecessarily obstructs the search for truth.

Yes. The trial court's order for prosecutorial discovery of the defense witness's prior statement was erroneous because it impinged on the traditional and arguably constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. The courts are not the proper bodies to create procedural rules that tend to impinge on these rights absent explicit legislative authorization. The complexity of the constitutional issues and the absence of legislative guidance on prosecutorial discovery necessitate disapproval of any compelled production of defense evidence. The discovery was harmless with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination and the work-product privilege, but the conviction for attempted second degree murder must be reversed due to instructional error. The court also emphasized that there is no duty for the trial court to instruct sua sponte on the limited admissibility of evidence of past criminal conduct or to give a limiting instruction on request, unless the evidence is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, highly prejudicial, and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.

Justice Newman concurred, except that he did not share the majority's "grave doubts that a valid discovery rule affecting criminal defendants can be devised."

Justice Richardson concurred in the judgment but dissented from the majority's sweeping prohibition on further prosecutorial discovery absent enabling legislation. He argued this constituted an abdication of judicial responsibility to resolve constitutional issues and rejected the court's inherent power to develop fair discovery procedures. Richardson believed the majority exaggerated the difficulty of devising constitutionally permissible rules, as federal courts have done so, and that prohibiting any prosecutorial discovery even where harmless in terms of incrimination was unnecessary and unfair.

People v. Collie

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Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

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