People v. Cleaves
91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2788, 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1991)
Rule of Law:
If a defendant actively participates in the overt act directly causing the death of a suicide victim, their act constitutes murder, and it is immaterial whether the act was committed pursuant to an agreement with the victim; merely furnishing the means for suicide, without active participation in the act causing death, constitutes aiding and abetting suicide.
Facts:
- John Cleaves, having personal experience with AIDS through friends, encountered Eaton, who revealed he had AIDS and expressed a strong desire to die, mentioning a previous suicide attempt.
- Eaton offered Cleaves various personal belongings and stated his intention to commit suicide by strangulation, asking Cleaves to help, to which Cleaves agreed.
- Eaton tied a sash around his neck and asked Cleaves to tie his hands to his feet, connecting the neck sash to his wrists, creating a taut ligature and an arched body position with Eaton's face in a pillow.
- As Eaton initiated the strangulation by 'pulling down' and 'straightening up,' Cleaves, at Eaton's request, placed his hands on Eaton's back to steady him and prevent him from falling off the bed.
- When the sash slipped from Eaton's neck, Cleaves, again at Eaton's request, rewrapped and retied it.
- Cleaves later admitted knowing Eaton would die from these actions, intending to help him die, and realizing Eaton would not have died without his physical assistance in tying and holding him down.
- After Eaton's death, Cleaves, following Eaton's earlier instructions, removed and disposed of the bindings and took Eaton's wallet and ATM card, using it to withdraw money.
Procedural Posture:
- John Cleaves was charged with murder.
- At trial, Cleaves requested jury instructions on the lesser related offense of aiding and abetting suicide (Pen. Code, § 401), which the trial court denied.
- Cleaves also requested jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court instructed the jury only on first and second degree murder, along with a special instruction stating that if murder was found, the victim's request was immaterial.
- The jury convicted John Cleaves of second degree murder.
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Issue:
Is a defendant who actively participates in the overt physical act causing a victim's death, even if at the victim's request to commit suicide, guilty of murder, or merely aiding and abetting a suicide, thereby warranting jury instructions on the lesser related offense of aiding and abetting a suicide?
Opinions:
Majority - WORK, J.
No, a defendant who actively participates in the overt physical act causing a victim's death, even if at the victim's request to commit suicide, is guilty of murder, not merely aiding and abetting a suicide, and therefore jury instructions on the lesser related offense of aiding and abetting a suicide were not warranted. The court affirmed Cleaves's conviction, finding his contentions meritless. The court cited In re Joseph G. (1983) and People v. Matlock (1959) to emphasize that the critical distinction between murder and aiding and abetting suicide lies in the defendant's active or passive role. Furnishing the means for suicide constitutes aiding and abetting, but actively participating in the death-causing act constitutes murder, regardless of the victim's agreement. The court found that Cleaves's actions, including tying Eaton into a position of strangulation and holding him down to ensure the act's completion, amounted to active assistance in the overt act of strangulation. Cleaves himself admitted knowing Eaton would die and that his actions were necessary for Eaton's death. Regarding Cleaves's request to fashion a new voluntary manslaughter crime for 'mercy killings,' the court declined, adhering to Matlock's precedent that such killings constitute murder and leaving such policy decisions to the Supreme Court. The court found no error in the implied malice instructions, stating that 'dangerous to human life' is synonymous with 'high probability of death' and had been approved by precedent. Since Cleaves admitted subjective awareness of the risk, involuntary manslaughter instructions were not warranted. Finally, any error in the jury instructions regarding the concurrence of act and intent was deemed harmless, as the jury was clearly instructed on the requisite mental state for second-degree murder, and no specific concurrence issue was in dispute.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between murder and aiding and abetting suicide in California, establishing that active participation in the physical act causing death, even with the victim's consent or request, constitutes murder. It reinforces the principle that 'mercy killing' does not automatically reduce culpability from murder to a lesser offense under existing law, leaving such policy considerations to higher courts or the legislature. The ruling highlights the critical importance of the defendant's direct involvement in the fatal act, serving as a key precedent for prosecuting cases where individuals assist in another's death, particularly in end-of-life scenarios. It underlines that mere intent or compassion does not negate the malice element when active participation in the act of killing is present.
