People v. Castro
696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 38 Cal. 3d 301 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
Article I, Section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution does not abrogate a trial court's traditional discretion under Evidence Code Section 352 to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions for impeachment. However, this discretion is limited to admitting only those prior felony convictions that necessarily involve 'moral turpitude,' which indicates a general readiness to do evil.
Facts:
- On June 14, 1982, silverware and other items were stolen during a residential burglary.
- On June 18, 1982, police stopped a car driven by Maria Castro's son, Richard, for a traffic violation.
- Inside the car, an officer found the stolen silverware contained in a pillowcase.
- Richard told the officer the silverware belonged to his mother, Maria Castro.
- Officers accompanied Richard to Castro's home, where Castro stated she owned silverware that was missing and described it as being wrapped in newspaper inside a pillowcase.
- When an officer brought the items from the car into her home, Castro identified the stolen silverware as her own.
- Castro later testified that she misidentified the items because she was not wearing her glasses and that she had initially claimed ownership to protect her son.
Procedural Posture:
- Maria Castro was charged with receiving stolen property in a California superior court (trial court).
- Before trial, Castro filed a motion to prohibit the prosecution from using her prior felony convictions for possession of heroin and possession of heroin for sale to impeach her testimony if she chose to testify.
- The trial court denied the motion, ruling that California Constitution Article I, Section 28, subdivision (f) required admission of the priors 'without limitation' and removed its discretion under Evidence Code § 352.
- Castro testified at trial, was impeached with the prior convictions, and the jury found her guilty.
- Castro appealed the judgment of conviction to the California Supreme Court, challenging the trial court's pretrial ruling on the impeachment motion.
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Issue:
Does Article I, Section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution, which states prior felony convictions shall be used 'without limitation' for impeachment, eliminate a trial court's discretion under Evidence Code Section 352 to exclude such convictions when their prejudicial effect substantially outweighs their probative value?
Opinions:
Majority - Kaus, J.
No. Article I, Section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution was not intended to abrogate the traditional and inherent power of the trial court under Evidence Code Section 352 to exclude prejudicial evidence. The court reconciled the apparent conflict between subdivision (f)'s 'without limitation' language and subdivision (d)'s explicit preservation of Section 352 by concluding that the provision was meant to overrule the rigid appellate-created rules from the 'People v. Antick' line of cases, but not the trial court's fundamental discretion. However, due process requires that any prior conviction used for impeachment must be relevant to credibility. A prior felony is only relevant if it involves 'moral turpitude,' defined as a 'general readiness to do evil.' Therefore, only felonies involving moral turpitude are admissible for impeachment, and even then, their admission is subject to the trial court’s Section 352 balancing test.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Grodin, J.
Yes. The language of subdivision (f) is unequivocal and its specific mandate that prior convictions be used 'without limitation' should control over the more general language of subdivision (d). The drafters of Proposition 8 intended to eliminate all trial court discretion to exclude prior convictions, just as Congress had done in response to the similar 'Luck' doctrine in federal court. However, he concurred that there is a constitutional threshold of relevance which the 'moral turpitude' test satisfies, and agreed the error in this specific case was harmless.
Concurrence - Lucas, J.
Yes. Subdivision (f) was intended to abrogate all judicially created restrictions, including the exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. He fully agreed with Justice Grodin that the 'without limitation' language removes the trial court's discretion. However, he dissented from the majority's creation of a 'moral turpitude' standard, arguing that 'Any prior felony conviction' means exactly that, and the commission of any felony necessarily bears on credibility.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Bird, C. J.
No. The majority correctly held that trial courts retain discretion under Evidence Code section 352. However, the 'moral turpitude' standard is an 'elusive concept incapable of precise general definition' that will lead to confusion and inconsistent application. The proper standard for relevance should remain whether the prior felony has as a necessary element an intent to deceive, defraud, lie, or steal, as this directly impacts the witness's character for honesty and veracity, which is the sole trait relevant to impeaching credibility under the Evidence Code.
Analysis:
This landmark decision interpreted the conflicting provisions of California's Proposition 8 ('The Victims' Bill of Rights') regarding witness impeachment. Instead of reading the 'without limitation' language as an absolute mandate, the court preserved the trial court's traditional gatekeeping function under Evidence Code § 352. It simultaneously established a new, two-part framework for admissibility: the court must first find the prior felony involves 'moral turpitude,' and only then may it exercise its discretion to weigh probative value against prejudice. This ruling fundamentally reshaped California evidence law, broadening the scope of impeachable offenses beyond crimes of dishonesty while still empowering trial judges to ensure fairness.
