People v. Carmona
627 N.E.2d 959, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 606 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The People cannot rely on statements obtained in violation of a defendant's indelible right to counsel and subsequently suppressed to establish an implied waiver of the CPLR 4505 cleric-congregant privilege.
Facts:
- On March 15, 1987, Olga Estremera was killed in the defendant's apartment.
- Following the slaying, defendant fled New York and went to Miami, Florida.
- In Miami, defendant met William Jaramillo at a bus terminal, told him he had “killed someone,” and Jaramillo referred him to Reverend Hernandez.
- Defendant subsequently spoke with Reverends Hernandez and Mimoso, seeking spiritual guidance, and confessed to them that he had strangled Estremera.
- The reverends convinced defendant that the right thing to do was to turn himself in to the authorities.
- Defendant then surrendered to the Miami police and, after Miranda warnings, confessed to strangling Estremera and informed Detective Torres that he had already given the same inculpatory information to Reverends Hernandez and Mimoso.
- An arrest warrant for defendant in connection with the Estremera homicide had been issued in New York prior to his surrender and interrogation in Miami.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged with homicide (second-degree murder).
- Defendant moved in limine (pretrial) for a Mapp-Huntley-Wade hearing to suppress evidence.
- The trial court concluded that defendant's statements to Reverends Hernandez and Mimoso were of a spiritual and confidential nature and thus initially privileged under CPLR 4505.
- The trial court further concluded that defendant had waived this privilege by relating the full content of the privileged communications to Detective Torres.
- The trial court ruled that defendant's statements to Detective Torres were inadmissible in the People's direct case because they were given without benefit of counsel after the indelible right to counsel had attached (due to an outstanding arrest warrant), but could be used for impeachment purposes.
- A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder.
- Defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the communications were privileged but that defendant had waived the privilege by voluntarily repeating their substance to the police.
- A judge of the Court of Appeals of New York granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does an implied waiver of the CPLR 4505 cleric-congregant privilege, based on a defendant's statements to police, have legal effect when those statements were obtained in violation of the defendant's indelible right to counsel and subsequently suppressed?
Opinions:
Majority - Titone, J.
No, an implied waiver of the CPLR 4505 cleric-congregant privilege, based on a defendant's statements to police, does not have legal effect when those statements were obtained in violation of the defendant's indelible right to counsel and subsequently suppressed. The court first affirmed that the communications between defendant and Reverends Hernandez and Mimoso were privileged under CPLR 4505, as they were made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance, as evidenced by defendant's search for spiritual help, discussions about God, praying, and confessing in a private setting. While acknowledging that an implied waiver could occur by disclosing confidential communications to third parties, the court held that the People could not rely on statements suppressed due to a violation of the indelible right to counsel to establish such a waiver. Defendant's indelible right to counsel attached when the New York arrest warrant was issued, rendering his subsequent statements to the Miami police (made without counsel) inadmissible under New York law (People v. Samuels). To allow these suppressed statements to establish a waiver of the cleric-congregant privilege would permit the People to indirectly benefit from an illegal act, thereby undermining the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring official misconduct. Therefore, the ministers' testimony regarding defendant's confidential statements should have been excluded. However, the court found this error to be harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt, including his presence at the scene, blood on his hands, flight, and confessions to Jaramillo, which rendered the erroneous admission of the ministers' testimony insignificant.
Concurring - Smith, J.
Yes, the ministers' testimony was properly admitted, because no cleric-congregant privilege was ever established by the defendant, and even if it was, it was properly waived by his voluntary disclosures to third parties, irrespective of the separate right to counsel issue. Justice Smith argued that defendant failed to establish the cleric-congregant privilege because he did not testify at the pretrial hearing to show an intent for confidentiality or that the communications were for spiritual guidance. Furthermore, at trial, defendant explicitly denied confessing to the ministers, which is inconsistent with claiming a privilege for those communications. Even assuming the privilege was established, defendant waived it by voluntarily disclosing the substance of his communications to William Jaramillo (a civilian) and then to the police. The waiver of a statutory privilege, like the cleric-congregant privilege, is distinct from the waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. The rule requiring counsel for waiver of the indelible right to counsel (People v. Samuels/Settles) applies to protecting a defendant from prosecutorial forces, not to the voluntary act of disclosing confidential information to third parties. Therefore, the suppression of defendant's statements to the police did not prevent the use of the fact of his disclosures to establish a waiver of the privilege concerning the ministers' testimony. Thus, the trial court correctly admitted the ministers' testimony, and no harmless error analysis was necessary.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the New York Court of Appeals' commitment to the indelible right to counsel and the exclusionary rule by preventing the indirect use of unconstitutionally obtained statements to establish a waiver of a separate statutory privilege. The ruling clarifies that a waiver, even of a statutory right, cannot be given legal effect if it flows from actions tainted by a constitutional violation, thereby broadly protecting the integrity of the justice system from official misconduct. It also delineates the scope and application of the CPLR 4505 cleric-congregant privilege, emphasizing its broad applicability but also the penitent's burden to establish its confidential and spiritual nature. The strong concurring opinion highlights a clear jurisprudential disagreement regarding the interaction between constitutional protections and statutory privileges, particularly when considering the source of a purported waiver.
