People v. Cardona
1983 Cal. App. LEXIS 1654, 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 191 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A dwelling is not considered 'inhabited' for the purposes of first-degree burglary once the residents have permanently ceased using it as a sleeping place and do not intend to return, even if some of their belongings remain inside and they still have a legal right to possess the property.
Facts:
- The Fuller family rented a house on Jefferson Street and began moving to a new home in Oceanside.
- On September 12, 1981, the Fullers moved out of the Jefferson Street house and spent the night at their new home.
- The Fullers did not intend to ever spend another night at the Jefferson Street house.
- The family had paid rent on the Jefferson Street house through September 15 and had not yet moved all of their belongings out.
- On the night of September 13, Antonio Cardona broke into the Jefferson Street house with the intent to steal the Fullers' remaining property.
- The Fullers returned to the house to retrieve some items and caught Cardona inside.
Procedural Posture:
- Antonio Cardona was charged with first degree burglary in California superior court, the trial court of first instance.
- Following a trial, the court found the house was inhabited and convicted Cardona of first degree burglary.
- The trial court granted Cardona three years of probation.
- Cardona, as the appellant, appealed his first-degree burglary conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a house remain an 'inhabited dwelling' for the purposes of first-degree burglary after its residents have permanently moved out and no longer intend to sleep there, but before they have removed all their belongings or their lease has expired?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown (Gerald), P. J.
No. A house ceases to be an 'inhabited dwelling' for first-degree burglary purposes once its residents no longer use it for sleeping or dwelling. The court reasoned that Penal Code section 459 defines 'inhabited' as 'currently being used for dwelling purposes.' The court determined that the crucial element for a house to be used for dwelling purposes is whether anyone sleeps in it or intends to do so in the future. In this case, the Fuller family had already slept in their new home and testified they had no intention of ever returning to sleep at the Jefferson Street house. The court held that using the house merely for storage of belongings was insufficient to render it inhabited. The defendant's subjective belief about whether the house was occupied is irrelevant; the dispositive factor is the residents' view of the house as their dwelling, which the Fullers no longer did.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the statutory definition of an 'inhabited dwelling' in the context of a residential move, narrowing the scope of first-degree burglary. It establishes that the residents' intent regarding the use of the property as a sleeping place is the dispositive factor, superseding the mere presence of belongings or a continuing legal possessory right like a lease. This precedent prioritizes the law's goal of protecting personal safety in a dwelling over the protection of property, distinguishing the higher-risk crime against habitation from a less severe crime against property. Future cases involving burglary of a recently vacated residence will now focus on the former residents' intent to return to sleep there.
