People v. Caldwell
681 P.2d 274, 203 Cal. Rptr. 433, 36 Cal.3d 210 (1984)
Rule of Law:
Under the provocative act murder doctrine, felons can be found guilty of murder for the death of a co-felon killed by police during a felony, even though the felony-murder rule does not apply to killings by non-felons, if their own malicious conduct, demonstrating a conscious disregard for life and a high probability of resulting in death, proximately caused the co-felon's death.
Facts:
- Anthony Belvin approached a Church's Fried Chicken patio window, ordered food, and indicated his companion, Washington, would pay.
- Belvin revealed a sawed-off shotgun, pointed it at employees, and announced a holdup, forcing an employee to open a cash register and hand over money, while Washington entered the building through a counter window with a handgun and approached the manager's office (where the manager was calling the sheriff's department).
- Washington and Belvin then left the establishment.
- Deputies Morris Boothroyd and Ronald Trujillo arrived, and an employee directed them; Deputy Boothroyd saw a man (Washington) enter a brown car driven by Caldwell, which drove away rapidly without headlights.
- Deputies pursued the brown car for 5-10 miles at speeds up to 70 mph, during which it ran stop signs and red lights, skidded out of control, and collided with a sheriff's vehicle.
- When a fourth sheriff's vehicle appeared, the brown car slowed; Washington pointed a shotgun at Deputies McSweeney and Hunter.
- Deputy Hunter accelerated and rammed the suspects' car head-on, causing Washington's shotgun to discharge and fly out of his hands.
- After the collision, Belvin leaned forward from the rear seat, put his hand out the window with a revolver, and aimed it, ignoring orders to 'freeze' and 'drop the gun,' while Caldwell opened his door, crouched behind it carrying a handgun, and also ignored commands to drop his weapon.
- Deputy Hunter fired at Belvin (and then Washington) when Belvin aimed at deputies; other deputies also fired, and Deputy McSweeney shot at Caldwell when Caldwell looked towards McSweeney's partner instead of dropping his gun.
- Belvin was wounded and died the next morning; tests indicated Deputy Lopez's gun probably fired the fatal bullet.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendants Ernest Edward Caldwell and Warren Edwin Washington were convicted of robbery and murder (Caldwell of second-degree murder, Washington of first-degree murder) in the trial court.
- Caldwell and Washington appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Can defendants be found guilty of murder for the death of a co-felon, killed by police in the course of a shootout, if their own malicious and provocative conduct proximately caused the death, even though the felony-murder rule does not extend to killings by non-felons?
Opinions:
Majority - Reynoso, J.
Yes, defendants can be found guilty of murder for the death of a co-felon killed by police during a shootout, as their own malicious and provocative conduct proximately caused the death. The court affirmed the murder convictions, reiterating that while the felony-murder rule does not apply to killings by victims or police, such killings do constitute murder if they proximately result from a felon's provocative conduct that demonstrates a conscious disregard for life and a high probability of death. The court found substantial evidence of malicious conduct by both defendants: Washington pointed a shotgun at deputies, an act highly probable to result in death; Caldwell engaged in reckless, high-speed evasion, running stop signs and colliding with a police vehicle; and both Caldwell and Belvin refused to surrender, with Caldwell exiting the car armed and taking cover. The court rejected the argument that Belvin's actions were the sole cause, emphasizing that there can be multiple proximate causes and that the brief lull in action after the collision did not dissipate the provocative force of the defendants' prior actions. The court concluded that the officers' lethal response was provoked by a violent confrontation created by the actions of Caldwell, Washington, and Belvin. For an act to be a proximate cause, it must be a 'substantial factor' in contributing to the result, and the concerted actions of co-felons need not be minutely determined for individual liability. The court affirmed the Washington-Gilbert doctrine, stressing its requirement of proving individual culpability and a 'culpable, murderous state of mind' through conduct 'highly probable' (not merely foreseeable) to result in death, evidencing a conscious disregard for human life. The court also found any instructional error regarding aider and abettor liability harmless given the jury's rejection of Caldwell's duress defense, and dismissed Washington's diminished capacity claim due to evidence of his deliberate conduct.
Concurring - Kaus, J.
Yes, defendants can be found guilty of murder for the death of a co-felon killed by police during a shootout, as Washington’s conduct in pointing and discharging the shotgun was a sufficient 'initiation of a gun-battle' to sustain the convictions. Justice Kaus concurred with the judgment, emphasizing a narrower view focusing on Washington's conduct. He believed that Washington's act of pointing and discharging the shotgun was a 'malicious act' sufficient under existing case law to be considered the 'initiation of a gun-battle' that led to Belvin’s death, thus sustaining the murder convictions for both Washington and Caldwell. Given this conclusion, he found it unnecessary to determine whether Caldwell’s reckless driving was a proximate cause or if there was substantial evidence supporting Caldwell’s alleged possession of a handgun, viewing these factors as non-critical in the sequence of events.
Dissenting - Bird, C. J.
No, defendants should not be found guilty of murder for the death of a co-felon killed by police, because the acts relied upon by the majority were either not the proximate cause of death or not sufficiently malicious. Chief Justice Bird dissented, arguing that the majority distorted prior decisions and undermined the principle that the felony-murder rule does not apply to killings by non-felons. She contended that under Gilbert, a malicious act 'over and above' the underlying felony must proximately cause death, meaning the third party must kill 'in reasonable response to such act.' She argued that Caldwell’s reckless driving and Washington’s shotgun pointing, though malicious, did not proximately cause Belvin’s death because the immediate threat from these acts had dissipated when the car stopped and the shotgun was out of reach. She criticized the majority's causation theories, including relying on a deputy's lingering fear (which she deemed an extraneous factor) and the inference that Belvin wouldn't have resisted if appellants surrendered (which she argued effectively overruled People v. Antick). Furthermore, she asserted that Caldwell's post-crash conduct—emerging, crouching with an alleged gun, but not pointing it—was neither supported by substantial evidence (as only one officer saw a gun, which was never found) nor sufficiently aggressive to establish implied malice. She accused the majority of confusing the reasonableness of the police response with the defendant's implied malice, thereby re-establishing the felony-murder rule for third-party killings by making culpability hinge on an officer's subjective impression rather than the defendant's malicious intent.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces and clarifies California's 'provocative act murder' doctrine, which holds felons liable for murder when a co-felon is killed by police or victims due to the surviving felons' own malicious conduct. It differentiates this liability from the traditional felony-murder rule by emphasizing the need for conscious disregard for life and a high probability of death as a result of the defendant's actions, and affirms that such actions must be a 'substantial factor' in causing the death. The decision broadens the scope of proximate causation by allowing for multiple contributing causes and recognizing that a short 'lull' in action does not necessarily break the chain of causation. This outcome highlights the continuing legal risks for felons who engage in dangerous and escalating behavior during a crime, even when the fatal shot is not fired by them.
