People v. Buttelo CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED, California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) (2015)
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Rule of Law:
While a prosecutor's misstatement of law regarding self-defense can be misconduct, it is not reversible error if, considering the entire closing argument and the jury instructions, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied the comments to reduce the prosecution's burden. A trial court does not coerce a jury verdict by ordering further deliberations after a jury reports an impasse, especially when deliberations were not extensively long and the court uses a model instruction designed to encourage agreement without dictating an outcome.
Facts:
- In October 2008, Joseph Buttelo was a Norteño gang member who routinely wore red, threw gang signs, and carried a loaded .45-caliber handgun for protection, especially in Sureño territory.
- On October 31, 2008, around 8:30 p.m., Buttelo was walking with friends Jessica Orsie and Jimmy Cromaty in the Arden-Arcade area of Sacramento, which Buttelo considered Sureño territory.
- A green van, driven by Jerardo Chairez and containing Gustavo Lopez (a Sureño gang member), Jonathan Gaeta, and Humberto Barajas, passed Buttelo and his friends, made a three-point turn, and pulled up beside them.
- Lopez, seated in the front passenger seat, rolled down his window and asked Buttelo if he was a 'chapete' (a derogatory term for Norteños), to which Buttelo responded by asking if Lopez was a 'scrap' (a derogatory term for Sureños).
- After a brief, heated argument, Lopez appeared to grab an object from the floorboard, opened the passenger door, and started to get out of the van.
- Buttelo took a step back and pulled the handgun from his waistband; when Lopez saw the gun, he 'jumped back in' the van and told Chairez, 'He has a gun. He has a gun, go.'
- Buttelo fired at least four rounds into the van as it drove away, striking Lopez in the back (who later died from his injuries) and Gaeta in the right leg.
- Buttelo fled to a friend's house and hid the gun under a mattress, later testifying that he fired in self-defense after seeing an unknown object in Lopez's hand, although a search of the van revealed no weapons other than a red steering wheel lock bar.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph Buttelo was charged with first degree murder (Count 1) and attempted first degree murder (Count 2) in Sacramento County Superior Court case No. 08F10072, and faced other charges in separate incidents (Counts 3 and 4 related to another shooting, and convictions for possession of marijuana in case No. 07F11996 and possession of a stabbing instrument in case No. 09F07953).
- A jury in the superior court convicted Buttelo of the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter (Counts 1 and 2), and found he personally used a firearm but did not commit the offenses for the benefit of a gang.
- The jury acquitted Buttelo of Counts 3 and 4.
- During jury deliberations, a juror was removed and replaced by an alternate juror, and the trial court instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew.
- After several days of renewed deliberations, the jury announced it had reached a verdict on Counts 3 and 4 but could not agree on Counts 1 and 2.
- The superior court accepted the jury's not guilty verdicts on Counts 3 and 4.
- Immediately after accepting the partial verdict, the trial court read the jury an instruction (previously approved in People v. Moore) encouraging further deliberation on Counts 1 and 2, and then sent them home with an order to return the following day.
- Defense counsel requested a mistrial in the superior court, citing juror emotional distress and expressing concern that any resulting verdict might be a product of coercion, but the trial court denied this request.
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Issue:
1. Does a prosecutor's misstatement of self-defense law during closing arguments constitute reversible misconduct if the jury was otherwise properly instructed and there is no reasonable likelihood they misapplied the comments? 2. Does a trial court coerce a jury verdict by ordering further deliberations after the jury declares an impasse, without first inquiring into the probability of agreement, when the deliberations were not excessively long and a model instruction was given? 3. Is a defendant entitled to presentence custody credit for days served on one case to be applied to a concurrently sentenced, but separate and chronologically distinct, case?
Opinions:
Majority - Hoch, J.
1. No, the prosecutor's misstatements about self-defense law during closing arguments did not constitute reversible misconduct because, when viewed in the context of the entire closing argument and the court's accurate instructions, there was no reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied the comments to lessen the prosecution's burden. The court presumes jurors follow the court's instructions over attorney arguments, and the jury was fully and accurately instructed on self-defense, including the additional requirements for a mutual combatant as stated in People v. Quach. Furthermore, the facts did not support defendant meeting the conditions for a mutual combatant to claim self-defense, as he did not attempt to withdraw when the victim indicated a desire to do so. 2. No, the trial court did not coerce a jury verdict by ordering further deliberations after the jury declared an impasse, without first inquiring into the probability of agreement, because the decision to continue deliberations rests in the trial court's discretion, and here, the deliberations were not 'extensively long' given the trial's length. The trial court properly focused on post-substitution deliberations and that the jury had only requested one readback related to the Halloween shooting before the instruction. The court's use of the instruction, previously approved in People v. Moore, was designed to encourage agreement without coercion by suggesting new deliberation methods and reiterating juror duties, rather than dictating an outcome. Jurors exhibiting emotional distress is not sufficient to show coercion when the court's actions were otherwise proper. 3. No, a defendant is not entitled to presentence custody credit for days served solely on one case to be applied to a concurrently sentenced, but separate and chronologically distinct, second case, unless the custody for the first case was also attributable to the second. The two days of credit Buttelo sought were attributable solely to case No. 07F11996, having been earned more than a year before he was arrested in case No. 08F10072. While People v. Kunath allows simultaneous credit when custody is simultaneous for multiple cases, that does not apply when the custody periods are entirely separate. Therefore, Buttelo is entitled to the two days of credit only for case No. 07F11996.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle that prosecutorial misstatements are assessed in the context of the entire trial, particularly when jury instructions are correct. It also upholds judicial discretion in managing jury impasses, providing guidance on when further deliberation orders, even without an initial inquiry into the probability of agreement, are not considered coercive. The custody credit ruling clarifies the 'attributable to' requirement under Penal Code Section 2900.5, distinguishing situations where presentence custody genuinely overlaps for multiple offenses from those where separate periods of custody for distinct offenses are merely sentenced concurrently, thereby impacting how credits are calculated for defendants facing multiple, disparate charges.
