People v. Bussel
97 Cal. App. Supp. 4th 1, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 159 (2002)
Rule of Law:
Vehicular manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2), which specifies acts committed 'without gross negligence,' requires only ordinary negligence to establish criminal liability, not a higher degree of criminal or gross negligence.
Facts:
- Daniel J. Bussel was driving his 11-year-old stepdaughter to school in the morning, intending to make a right turn at an intersection.
- As Bussel approached the intersection, he looked to his left for oncoming traffic.
- Two individuals, Betty Brown (73 years old, the decedent) and Juan Huerta, began walking across an unmarked crosswalk at the intersection.
- Bussel's lane of traffic was controlled by a stop sign with a limit line, but he did not stop and instead went through the intersection at about three or four miles per hour.
- Bussel did not see Brown and Huerta, who were to his right, and his vehicle struck both persons.
- Huerta suffered abrasions to his knees, while Brown sustained a head injury, bleeding at the scene.
- Brown was taken to a hospital where she later died from injuries related to the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel J. Bussel was charged in an amended misdemeanor complaint with vehicular manslaughter, in violation of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2).
- Bussel pleaded not guilty to the charge.
- A jury trial was conducted, which resulted in Bussel's conviction.
- Bussel was subsequently sentenced to three years of summary probation, including community service and a fine, without any custody time.
- Bussel, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County.
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Issue:
Does vehicular manslaughter, as defined by California Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2), require a finding of criminal or gross negligence, or is ordinary negligence sufficient to establish criminal liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Lee, J.
No, vehicular manslaughter under California Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(2) does not require criminal or gross negligence; ordinary negligence is sufficient to establish criminal liability. The court affirmed this long-standing interpretation, relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Dennis B. (1976). Dennis B. clarified that while Penal Code section 20 generally mandates a union of act and intent or criminal negligence for a crime, this requirement is explicitly excluded when a statute, like section 192, subdivision (c)(2), specifies 'without gross negligence.' The court distinguished appellant's reliance on People v. Cox (2000) and People v. Wells (1996), explaining that those cases pertained to involuntary manslaughter or gross vehicular manslaughter, which have different mens rea requirements or focus on the 'dangerous under the circumstances' nature of the underlying unlawful act, not the degree of negligence for 'without gross negligence' offenses. The court further rejected Bussel's due process challenge, stating that the Legislature's decision to impose criminal liability for ordinary negligence in vehicular manslaughter is rationally related to the state's substantial interest in regulating public highways and protecting citizens from the inherent dangers posed by vehicles. Finally, the court found that the trial court's jury instructions accurately reflected the law, noting that the instruction that an act 'might cause death' was essentially equivalent to requiring that the act be 'dangerous to human life under the circumstances.' The evidence presented at trial was deemed sufficient to support the conviction under the ordinary negligence standard.
Concurring - Beverly, P.J.
Concurring - Kriegler, J.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the precedent in California that individuals can be held criminally liable for vehicular manslaughter (specifically, subdivision (c)(2)) based solely on ordinary negligence, without requiring a showing of criminal or gross negligence. It reinforces the legislative intent to treat vehicular fatalities differently due to the unique risks associated with driving, maintaining a lower threshold for criminal culpability in these circumstances. For law students, this case is crucial for understanding the distinctions within California's manslaughter statutes and how mens rea requirements can vary, particularly when a statute explicitly excludes 'gross negligence.' It highlights the importance of statutory interpretation and the deference courts give to legislative policy decisions regarding public safety.
