People v. Burnett
110 Cal. App. 4th 868, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 8075 (2003)
Rule of Law:
A defendant is criminally liable for cruelly killing an animal under Penal Code § 597(b) if their aggravated or reckless conduct is a substantial factor in the death and the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that conduct, even if the direct cause of death is an intervening force.
Facts:
- McBurnett was driving to the airport in heavy rain and congested traffic with her dog, Leo, asleep on her lap.
- Defendant Burnett aggressively cut off McBurnett's vehicle, causing her to tap his bumper lightly.
- Burnett exited his SUV, approached McBurnett's car yelling, and reached through her open window.
- Burnett snatched the dog from McBurnett's lap and threw it into the oncoming lanes of the dark, busy roadway.
- Burnett immediately fled the scene while McBurnett ran into traffic attempting to rescue the dog.
- The dog, terrified and disoriented, ran through traffic before being struck and killed by a passing minivan.
- Burnett later hid his vehicle and altered his physical appearance to evade identification by the police.
Procedural Posture:
- The state charged the defendant with a felony violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b) (animal cruelty).
- A jury found the defendant guilty as charged.
- The trial court imposed the aggravated term of three years in state prison.
- The defendant appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit the crime of cruelly killing an animal when he intentionally throws a dog onto a busy roadway where it is subsequently struck by a vehicle, or does the vehicle constitute an intervening superseding cause that absolves the defendant of liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Premo, J.
Yes, the defendant is criminally liable because his act of throwing the dog into traffic was a cruel act that proximately caused the death, which was a foreseeable consequence. The court reasoned that 'cruel' implies a willingness to cause pain or indifference to suffering, and throwing a dog onto a highway clearly meets this definition. Regarding causation, the court held that the minivan was not a superseding cause because it was eminently foreseeable that a small dog thrown onto a busy, rainy highway at night would be struck by a vehicle. The defendant's conduct set the chain of events in motion and remained a substantial factor in the death. Additionally, the court found that the admission of evidence regarding a prior dog killing by the defendant was appropriate to negate his claim of accident, and that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call the defendant to testify given the 'preposterous' nature of the defendant's proposed story.
Analysis:
This case affirms the application of proximate cause principles to animal cruelty statutes. It clarifies that a perpetrator cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences of their reckless actions simply because a third party (in this case, a driver) struck the final blow. The decision underscores that intervening acts do not break the chain of causation if those acts are foreseeable. Furthermore, the case illustrates the admissibility of prior bad acts under Evidence Code § 1101(b) to prove intent and absence of mistake when a defendant claims an act was accidental.
