People v. Brown
82 Misc.2d 115, 1974 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2032, 368 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1974)
Rule of Law:
Law enforcement must immediately cease interrogation once a suspect in custody unequivocally requests an attorney, and must either provide privacy for statutorily privileged communications or issue a specific warning that overheard statements may be used against the suspect.
Facts:
- The defendant was arrested for murder allegedly committed in the early morning hours of October 25, 1972.
- At his apartment, a police officer and then a detective gave the defendant Miranda warnings, after which he made some remarks.
- At the precinct house, an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) again apprised the defendant of his rights and recorded a question-and-answer session.
- During the recorded interrogation, the defendant admitted his presence and a fight with the deceased, but repeatedly avoided admitting he stabbed the deceased, stating he would 'take the fifth' and 'never testify to that until the day I die.'
- The defendant then explicitly declared, 'No more statement without a lawyer. I give you, I defended myself on the statement. I’m not gonna give you, no sir, how I open that knife. I’m not.'
- Following this request, the detective present attempted to reassure the defendant, telling him the ADA was just trying to get the facts and would decide the charge, implying 'We’re not trying to hurt you,' after which the defendant continued to talk apologetically.
- After the interrogation, the defendant was booked and requested to make a phone call to his minister, Bishop Hicks.
- Patrolman McKenna dialed the number for the defendant and remained in the same room, overhearing the defendant say loudly to his minister, 'Bishop Hicks, praise the Lord, I need your prayers, I have killed a man.'
- The defendant had not been accorded privacy for this call, nor explicitly warned that overheard statements during it could be used against him.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was arrested and charged with murder.
- Defendant moved to suppress certain oral statements he made while in police custody.
- The court conducted a Huntley hearing to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of these statements.
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Issue:
1. Does law enforcement violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to interrogate the defendant after they unequivocally request the presence of an attorney? 2. Is a confidential communication made by a defendant in police custody to their minister, which is overheard by a police officer due to the lack of privacy, admissible as evidence when the defendant was not specifically warned that such a conversation could be used against them?
Opinions:
Majority - Edward J. Greenfield, J.
1. Yes, law enforcement does violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by continuing interrogation after an unequivocal request for an attorney. The court held that the Assistant District Attorney should have immediately ceased all further interrogation once the defendant declared, 'No more statement without a lawyer.' Citing Miranda v. Arizona and People v. Paulin, the court emphasized that if a defendant requests counsel, law enforcement must respect that decision. The subsequent attempts by the detective to reassure the defendant and dissuade him from his request for counsel were constitutionally impermissible, as the right to counsel and silence, once invoked, is substantial and meaningful and should not be undermined by persuasion or pressure. Although the court was prepared to suppress the statements made after this invocation, defense counsel ultimately withdrew the objection for those specific statements as they were largely exculpatory. 2. No, a confidential communication between a defendant in police custody and their minister, overheard by a police officer due to the lack of privacy, is not admissible when no specific warning was given that such a conversation could be used against them. The court ruled that the defendant's statement to his minister, overheard by Patrolman McKenna, was inadmissible. While communications between a penitent and minister are generally privileged under CPLR 4505 and can be waived if made in the presence of an ordinary third party (citing Matter of City Council of City of N. Y. v Goldwater and Baumann v Steingester), the custodial police officer was not an 'ordinary third person' because the defendant was in custody, and the officer was guarding him. To preserve the statutory privilege and ensure basic fairness and justice, the court stated that officers must either: (1) provide conditions of privacy (e.g., a phone booth or private room) for such communications, or (2) specifically warn the defendant that if the communication is overheard, it may be used against them. The general Miranda warnings were deemed insufficient for this specific context, as the defendant had relaxed his guard, reasonably believing he was having a privileged conversation. The court granted the motion to suppress this specific telephone call confession.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the strict interpretation of Miranda rights by unequivocally stating that all interrogation must cease immediately upon a defendant's clear request for an attorney. Beyond formal interrogation, it establishes a critical duty for law enforcement regarding privileged communications made by a defendant in custody, extending the principles of fairness and warnings. The ruling mandates that police must either ensure privacy for such communications or issue specific warnings about the potential for them to be overheard and used as evidence. This broadens the scope of protection against self-incrimination, ensuring that defendants are fully informed of the consequences of their statements even outside structured questioning, thereby influencing police protocols for prisoner communication and upholding the meaningfulness of constitutional rights.
