People v. Brown
1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10969, 68 A.D.2d 503, 417 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
The defense of justification for escape from a penal institution under New York Penal Law § 35.05 is available only when the escape is compelled by an imminent danger of personal injury that cannot be avoided by resort to authorities or other legal means, and the prisoner surrenders to law enforcement promptly upon attaining safety. The defense of duress under Penal Law § 40.00 requires the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force, which must be immediate and capable of immediate exercise.
Facts:
- On April 18, 1973, Brown was committed to the Brooklyn House of Detention under an indictment charging him with murder, having previously served a 25-year sentence in Missouri for assault with intent to kill.
- On September 27, 1973, Brown was escorted to Kings County Hospital for treatment of a possible ulcer.
- At the hospital, Brown's handcuffs were removed for an X-ray, and he was then returned to a dressing booth.
- Brown disappeared from the dressing booth; guards were told he was seen outside the building and pursued him unsuccessfully.
- Brown was apprehended on October 3, 1973, six days after his escape.
- Brown intended to offer testimony from a fellow inmate that numerous threats were made against Brown’s life by prison guards between April 18 and September 27, 1973, causing him chest pains.
- Brown intended to offer testimony from lawyers regarding ongoing litigation challenging unconstitutional conditions in the Brooklyn House of Detention, including successful actions.
- Brown intended to testify that a police officer transporting him from Missouri to New York in April 1973 had pointed his revolver at him on several occasions and threatened his life.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Brown was committed to the Brooklyn House of Detention under a murder indictment.
- Defendant Brown was subsequently indicted for escape in the second degree.
- At trial (Criminal Term), the court sustained the prosecution's objections to Brown's offers of proof for the defenses of justification and duress, finding them irrelevant.
- The trial court refused to admit testimony from Brown regarding threats made by a police officer during transport.
- The trial court refused to charge justification as a defense to the jury.
- Brown was convicted of escape in the second degree.
- Brown appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
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Issue:
Does New York's Penal Law § 35.05 (justification) or § 40.00 (duress) permit a prisoner to use general fear of threats or intolerable prison conditions as a defense to the crime of escape in the second degree, particularly when the prisoner does not face imminent danger at the time of escape and does not promptly surrender?
Opinions:
Majority - Hopkins, J. P.
No, the evidence tendered by the defendant would not have met the statutory standards for the defenses of justification or duress, and the trial court was therefore correct in rejecting the proof. New York Penal Law § 35.05 permits the defense of justification—or necessity—in limited cases where conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury about to occur through no fault of the actor, and the gravity of avoiding that injury clearly outweighs the objectives of the statute condemning the conduct. While prison conditions can theoretically justify an escape if they pose an imminent danger of personal injury that cannot be avoided by resort to authorities or other legal means, and the prisoner surrenders to custody within a reasonably prompt time, Brown's offer of proof failed to meet these stringent requirements. Brown remained at liberty for six days without any attempt to return to custody. His escape was from a hospital, not the prison, and he was not under any imminent danger of personal injury at the time of the escape. The offers of proof regarding general threats by prison guards were not specific as to individuals or time, and the threat by a detective five months prior to the escape did not establish imminent danger. The existence of litigation challenging prison conditions did not prove imminent danger to the defendant but rather demonstrated available legal remedies. Psychiatric testimony about stress from unhealthful prison conditions also did not satisfy the specific tests for justification. Similarly, the defense of duress under Penal Law § 40.00 was not applicable. Duress requires coercion by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force. There was no physical force or threat of imminent physical force on Brown at the time of his escape, as he fled from a hospital where he was receiving treatment. Duress demands immediate force or an immediate threat of force, not one incapable of immediate exercise.
Dissenting - Suozzi, J.
Yes, the defendant's offer of proof was of sufficient particularity to raise a genuine factual issue with regard to the defense of justification, which could only be resolved upon submission to the jury. While agreeing with the majority that an escape can be justified by conditions posing an imminent danger of personal injury not avoidable by other legal means, the dissenting justice argued that the defendant’s offer of proof, specifically the testimony from a fellow inmate about numerous threats on Brown's life by prison guards up until the day of his escape, was sufficiently specific. This evidence, which covered the period from his commitment to the day of his escape, warranted submitting the defense of justification to the jury, and therefore, the judgment of conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the availability of justification and duress defenses for prison escape in New York, setting a high bar for what constitutes an 'emergency measure.' It underscores the judiciary's preference for internal administrative and legal remedies (like habeas corpus or civil rights lawsuits) to address intolerable prison conditions rather than self-help through escape. The decision emphasizes the strict requirements of imminence of danger and the necessity of prompt surrender to authorities after escaping danger, making it difficult for prisoners to successfully argue these defenses based on general threats or conditions not directly preceding their escape.
