People v. Breverman
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 960 P.2d 1094 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on every theory of a lesser included offense that is supported by substantial evidence. An erroneous failure to do so is an error of state law, subject to the harmless error standard of review, requiring reversal only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the instruction been given.
Facts:
- After two young men, Yoon Ju and Hyun Kim, were beaten by a group of youths at Scott Breverman's house, they planned a retaliatory confrontation.
- The next evening, Kim returned with a group of friends, including Andreas Suryaatmadja, armed with weapons like a baseball bat and parts of a 'Club' automobile security device.
- Kim first slashed a tire on Breverman’s BMW, which was parked in the driveway. After a brief verbal exchange with Breverman, the group regrouped.
- Several members of the group then approached Breverman's home and began to violently batter his BMW with their weapons, shouting epithets.
- As the car alarm sounded, Breverman fired several shots from inside his front door through a window pane.
- As the group fled, Breverman stepped outside into his driveway and fired a second volley of shots toward them.
- One of the bullets from the second volley struck and fatally wounded Andreas Suryaatmadja in the back of the head as he was fleeing.
Procedural Posture:
- Scott Breverman was charged by information with murder and a firearm enhancement in Los Angeles County Superior Court (trial court).
- At trial, the court limited the charge to second-degree murder and instructed on justifiable homicide and voluntary manslaughter based only on an 'imperfect self-defense' theory.
- A jury convicted Breverman of second-degree murder and found the firearm enhancement true.
- Breverman (appellant) appealed to the California Court of Appeal, arguing the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on a 'heat of passion' theory of voluntary manslaughter.
- The Court of Appeal agreed with Breverman, found the error was prejudicial under the prevailing People v. Sedeno standard, and reversed the conviction.
- The People (petitioner) sought review from the California Supreme Court, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on every theory of a lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence, and is the erroneous failure to do so reversible per se or subject to a harmless error analysis?
Opinions:
Majority - Baxter, J.
Yes, a trial court has a duty to instruct on all supported theories of a lesser included offense, but no, the failure to do so is not reversible per se. A trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses extends to every theory, such as heat of passion, that finds substantial support in the evidence, regardless of the defendant's trial strategy. This duty ensures the jury can consider the 'full range of possible verdicts' and protects the jury’s truth-ascertainment function. However, this duty arises from California law alone, not the federal Constitution. Therefore, an error in failing to so instruct is a 'misdirection of the jury' under the California Constitution, which is not a structural defect requiring automatic reversal. Instead, such an error must be reviewed for actual prejudice under the standard from People v. Watson, which requires reversal only if an examination of the entire record shows it is 'reasonably probable' the defendant would have achieved a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred. The court overruled the near-automatic reversal standard from People v. Sedeno.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
No, the trial court did not err, and even if it did, the error was not reversible. Manslaughter is not a lesser necessarily included offense of murder because one can commit murder (e.g., of a fetus) without committing manslaughter. Therefore, no sua sponte instruction was required. Furthermore, any potential error was harmless because the jury's verdict convicting Breverman of second-degree murder was supported by sufficient evidence and did not constitute a 'miscarriage of justice.' The failure to instruct on a lesser offense did not prejudice the verdict on the greater offense.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
Yes, the trial court erred, and the error was of federal constitutional magnitude, not just state law. The absence of heat of passion is a functional element of murder when evidence of provocation is presented, because heat of passion negates the element of malice. The trial court's failure to instruct on heat of passion was therefore an incomplete instruction on the elements of murder itself, violating the defendant's federal due process and Sixth Amendment rights. This constitutional error should be reviewed under the stricter Chapman 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard, and under that standard, the error here was not harmless and requires reversal.
Dissenting - Brown, J.
No, the trial court did not err because the entire doctrine requiring sua sponte instructions on lesser included offenses is flawed and should be abolished. The rule finds no basis in the state Constitution and fundamentally distrusts the adversary system. Courts should only be required to give instructions on lesser included offenses when requested by one of the parties, consistent with the federal rule. Under a request-only rule, the trial court here committed no error.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in California criminal appellate procedure by replacing the long-standing Sedeno standard of near-automatic reversal for the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses. By adopting the more stringent Watson 'reasonable probability' harmless error test, the court has made it substantially more difficult for defendants to obtain reversals on this common ground of appeal. This ruling aligns the review standard for this type of instructional error with the general standard for most state-law trial errors, reflecting a broader judicial trend away from per se reversal rules. The case solidifies the trial court's duty to instruct on all theories but simultaneously lowers the consequence of failing to do so, placing a greater burden on the appellant to demonstrate actual prejudice from the error.
Unlock the full brief for People v. Breverman