People v. Brady
129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 2005 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4701, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An intervening act, such as the negligence of a third party or victim, does not break the chain of proximate causation and become a superseding cause if the resulting harm was a foreseeable type of consequence of the defendant's original wrongful act. To absolve the defendant of criminal liability, the intervening act must be an unforeseeable, extraordinary, and abnormal occurrence.
Facts:
- Franklin Neal Brady and Richard Carkeek Mortensen were associated with a methamphetamine laboratory located in a trailer in a remote, wooded area.
- On August 27, 2001, Brady started a fire in an outdoor fire ring near the trailer, which he claimed was to boil water for a sitz bath.
- Sparks from the fire ring ignited nearby dry grass, and the fire quickly spread, growing into a large forest fire that also engulfed the trailer.
- Brady and Mortensen attempted to fight the fire but were unsuccessful and fled the scene as it grew out of control.
- The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) dispatched air tankers to combat the remote fire.
- Two CDF pilots, Lawrence Groff and Lars Stratte, were flying separate tankers to drop fire retardant.
- During the firefighting operation, Groff's plane, which witnesses said was flying in the wrong direction and below the established flight pattern altitude, collided mid-air with Stratte's plane.
- Both pilots were killed in the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Franklin Neal Brady was charged by information in a California superior court (trial court) with multiple offenses, including recklessly setting a fire that caused the deaths of two pilots.
- Following a joint jury trial with his co-defendant, the jury found Brady guilty of recklessly starting a fire that caused the deaths of the pilots.
- The jury found Brady not guilty of murder.
- The trial court sentenced Brady to a total of 13 years and eight months in prison.
- Brady (appellant) appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, First District.
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Issue:
Is an intervening act of negligence by a third party a superseding cause that relieves a defendant of criminal liability for a death, when the death is a foreseeable type of harm resulting from the defendant's initial reckless act?
Opinions:
Majority - Pollak, J.
No, an intervening act of negligence by a third party is not a superseding cause that relieves a defendant of criminal liability if the resulting death was a foreseeable type of harm. The defendant remains criminally liable for the direct, natural, and probable consequences of their act, which includes foreseeable harm, regardless of whether a third party's conduct also contributed to the result. The court reasoned that proximate cause in criminal law hinges on foreseeability. An intervening cause only becomes a superseding cause that breaks the chain of liability if it is an 'extraordinary and abnormal occurrence' that was unforeseeable. The court held that the critical question is not whether the specific intervening acts (e.g., pilot error, violation of flight protocols, or minor impairment) were foreseeable, but whether the general type of harm—a fatal aircraft accident during a complex aerial firefighting operation—was a foreseeable consequence of recklessly starting a forest fire. Given the inherent dangers of fighting wildfires with aircraft, the court found such a collision was within the scope of foreseeable risks. Therefore, evidence of the pilot's alleged negligence was irrelevant and properly excluded because it could not legally constitute a superseding cause.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that foreseeability of the type of harm, rather than the specific mechanics of the harm, is the touchstone of proximate cause analysis in criminal law. It clarifies that a victim's or third party's contributory negligence is not a defense and will not sever causation unless it is so extraordinary and abnormal as to be unforeseeable. The ruling limits a defendant's ability to introduce evidence of intervening negligence to escape liability, thereby strengthening the causal link between a reckless act and its probable consequences. Future cases involving intervening acts will likely focus more on whether the ultimate harm was within the scope of risks created by the defendant's conduct, rather than on the blameworthiness of the intervening actor.
