People v. Bartee
566 N.E.2d 855, 153 Ill. Dec. 5, 208 Ill. App.3d 105 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
In Illinois, defense counsel's good-faith determination that a client intends to commit perjury is a sufficient basis for implementing remedial measures, such as narrative testimony, and does not require counsel to demonstrate a "firm factual basis" for that belief.
Facts:
- Eddie J. Bartee, Jr. was on trial for attempted armed robbery.
- Midway through the trial, Bartee expressed his desire to testify on his own behalf.
- A conflict arose between Bartee and his defense attorney regarding the content of Bartee's proposed testimony.
- This conflict led the defense attorney to believe that Bartee intended to commit perjury if he were to testify.
Procedural Posture:
- Eddie J. Bartee, Jr. was charged by indictment with attempted armed robbery in the circuit court of Kane County, a state trial court.
- During the jury trial, defense counsel made a motion to withdraw, citing an ethical conflict regarding Bartee's intended testimony and referencing case law on client perjury.
- The trial court denied counsel's motion to withdraw.
- The trial court ruled that Bartee could testify, but only in a narrative format, and ordered his counsel not to comment on the testimony during closing arguments.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Bartee guilty.
- The trial court sentenced Bartee to a 12-year term of imprisonment.
- Bartee, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing he was denied a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial by requiring the defendant to testify in a narrative format, without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if defense counsel has a "firm factual basis" for believing the defendant will commit perjury?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McLaren
No. A trial court does not violate a defendant's rights by ordering narrative testimony based on counsel's good-faith belief of impending perjury. The court rejected the defendant's argument that his counsel must first demonstrate a 'firm factual basis' for such a belief. Instead, the court followed the Illinois Supreme Court's precedent in People v. Flores, which established a less stringent 'good-faith determination' standard. This standard gives defense counsel the discretion to determine whether a client or witness will testify untruthfully. The court reasoned that this discretion applies to a defendant's testimony as well as to other witnesses. Therefore, the trial court's decision to allow narrative testimony was a proper way to balance the defendant's right to testify against counsel's ethical obligation not to present false evidence, and an evidentiary hearing to probe counsel's belief was unnecessary.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'good-faith determination' standard in Illinois for defense attorneys who suspect their client intends to commit perjury, explicitly rejecting the stricter 'firm factual basis' test used in some federal circuits like the Eighth Circuit. It reinforces the significant discretion afforded to defense counsel in managing complex ethical dilemmas, prioritizing their professional judgment over a formal, court-mandated factual inquiry. By endorsing the narrative testimony solution, the opinion provides a practical and accepted procedure for trial courts to navigate the conflict between a defendant's right to testify and an attorney's duty of candor to the court. This precedent makes it more difficult for a defendant to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from an attorney's actions to prevent perjury.
