People v. Banks
351 P.3d 330, 61 Cal. 4th 788, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
To be subject to a felony-murder special circumstance under California Penal Code § 190.2(d), a non-killer accomplice must be a "major participant" in the underlying felony and act with "reckless indifference to human life," a standard requiring a subjective awareness of a grave risk of death beyond the general foreseeability of death inherent in any armed felony.
Facts:
- On October 1, 2008, Lovie Troy Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery of a medical marijuana dispensary planned by Leon Banks, David Gardiner, and Brandon Daniels.
- Banks, Gardiner, and Daniels entered the dispensary, tied up employees, and searched for items.
- During the robbery, security guard Noe Gonzalez struggled with the robbers at the front door.
- Leon Banks shot Noe Gonzalez twice, killing him, while Matthews was approximately three blocks away in a car.
- After the shooting, Matthews drove towards the dispensary, picked up Daniels and Gardiner one block away, and drove them from the scene.
- Matthews's GPS data showed his movements, including being near the dispensary at 2:51 p.m., then three blocks away for about 45 minutes, and then moving back towards the dispensary after the shooting at 3:46 p.m.
- Cell phone records showed calls between Matthews and Banks before and shortly after the killing, but the content of these calls was not known.
- Matthews, Gardiner, and Daniels were members of the same criminal street gang, but there was no evidence that Matthews or his confederates had previously committed murder or that Matthews knew they had killed before. Banks was not a member of their gang.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in Los Angeles County Superior Court convicted Lovie Troy Matthews of first-degree murder (under a felony-murder theory), burglary, and attempted robbery, and found true a felony-murder special circumstance under Penal Code §§ 187(a) and 190.2(a)(17).
- Matthews was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, as the prosecution did not seek the death penalty.
- Matthews appealed to the California Court of Appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the special-circumstance true finding.
- The Court of Appeal rejected Matthews's challenge, affirming the special circumstance and holding that his actions as a getaway driver, with knowledge that death was a possibility in an armed robbery, were legally sufficient under section 190.2(d).
- The California Supreme Court granted review to address the proper construction of section 190.2(d).
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Issue:
Does an accomplice who acts solely as a getaway driver for an armed robbery, is not present at the immediate scene of the murder, and is unaware of specific circumstances indicating a grave risk of death beyond the inherent risk of an armed felony, qualify as a "major participant" with "reckless indifference to human life" under California Penal Code § 190.2(d) for a felony-murder special circumstance?
Opinions:
Majority - Werdegar, J.
No, an accomplice who acts solely as a getaway driver in an armed robbery, remains absent from the immediate scene of the murder, and lacks subjective awareness of a grave risk of death beyond the inherent dangers of the felony, does not qualify as a "major participant" with "reckless indifference to human life" under Penal Code § 190.2(d). The court found that Section 190.2(d) codified the standard established by Tison v. Arizona and Enmund v. Florida, which requires an individualized assessment of a defendant's culpability, focusing on their personal role and mental state. Matthews's actions were analogous to Earl Enmund's in Enmund, who was merely a getaway driver absent from the scene of the killings. The court determined that mere participation in an armed robbery, with only general awareness of the foreseeable risk of death, is insufficient to meet the "reckless indifference" standard. Matthews's lack of involvement in the planning or procuring of weapons, his absence from the scene, his inability to intervene, and the lack of evidence that he knew his confederates were prone to lethal violence all pointed to his culpability being closer to Enmund's "minor actor" role than to the Tison brothers' "major participant" role. The court explicitly disapproved of lower court rulings that suggested knowledge of an accomplice being armed, by itself, established reckless indifference. This standard, derived from federal constitutional limits on the death penalty, applies equally to felony-murder special circumstances leading to life imprisonment without parole.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of felony-murder special circumstances for non-killers in California. By firmly aligning state law with the Tison and Enmund standards, the court establishes a high bar for finding "major participation" and "reckless indifference to human life." The decision prevents the automatic application of these special circumstances to accomplices, such as getaway drivers, whose involvement is peripheral to the killing itself, thus ensuring that culpability for life imprisonment without parole is based on a defendant's direct actions and subjective mental state rather than vicarious liability. This ruling will likely lead to closer scrutiny of evidence in felony-murder cases involving non-killers, particularly for those in support roles, and may serve as a basis for appeals in similar past convictions.
