People v. Baker
9 Cal.5th 371 (2021)
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Rule of Law:
In cases involving sexual offenses and domestic violence, courts may admit propensity evidence under California Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109, subject to the trial court's discretion under Section 352 to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence, and such admission does not violate due process. For homicides committed before People v. Farley, the felony-murder rule's merger doctrine does not apply to a burglary predicated on an intent to commit sexual assault (rape, sodomy, or sexual penetration by foreign object) because these acts constitute an independent felonious purpose. Additionally, a parole revocation fine is properly imposed on a defendant sentenced to death if a determinate sentence is also imposed.
Facts:
- Judy Palmer expressed fear of Paul Wesley Baker to a friend, stating he would be responsible if anything happened to her.
- Palmer and Baker's on-again, off-again relationship ended in early April 2004, after which Baker repeatedly harassed Palmer.
- On April 5, 2004, Baker forced his way into Palmer's apartment, leading to the issuance of a restraining order against him.
- After Baker's release from custody, Palmer's Ford Escort disappeared, and Baker was seen driving it before giving it to an acquaintance for drugs.
- On April 17, 2004, Palmer was last seen alive, having again expressed to her daughter and a friend that she was afraid Baker would hurt her.
- After Palmer's disappearance, Baker was seen driving her employer's Ford Ranger and told an acquaintance he had "beat the pussy up," showing scratches on his face, and expressed consciousness of guilt.
- Palmer's severely decomposed body, wrapped in blankets and rope, was discovered on May 11, 2004, in a desert area, with items belonging to both her and Baker found nearby.
- DNA analysis by a testifying criminalist linked Baker's sperm to an aqua-colored blanket and towel cutting found with Palmer's body, and he could not be excluded as the source of sperm on Palmer's underwear.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Wesley Baker was charged in Los Angeles County Superior Court (LA045977) with first-degree murder, forcible rape, first-degree residential burglary, grand theft auto, and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle regarding Judy Palmer, along with multiple charges related to other women.
- A jury convicted Baker of first-degree murder (with rape and burglary special circumstances), forcible rape, first-degree residential burglary, grand theft auto, and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle concerning Palmer, and several sexual offenses concerning Kathleen S. and Lorna T.
- The jury acquitted Baker of sexual penetration by foreign object related to Palmer and other charges concerning Monica H., Laura M., and Susanne K.
- The jury returned a verdict of death at the close of the penalty phase.
- The trial court denied Baker's automatic motion to modify the verdict.
- The case came before the California Supreme Court on automatic appeal due to the death sentence.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by admitting extensive propensity evidence of prior sexual offenses and domestic violence, by applying the felony-murder rule to a burglary predicated on an intent to commit sexual assault, or by making other errors in jury selection, evidence admission, or sentencing, thereby requiring reversal of Paul Wesley Baker's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
No, the trial court did not err in a manner requiring reversal of Paul Wesley Baker's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. The court found no Batson/Wheeler error, deferring to the trial court's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility and the race-neutral reasons (juror reluctance to impose the death penalty) for peremptory strikes, noting the defense did not dispute the prosecutor's sincerity or observations at trial. Similarly, the court affirmed the excusal of two jurors for cause based on their death penalty views, finding substantial evidence of impairment to their duties, again deferring to the trial court's observation of their demeanor. Regarding the admissibility of extensive propensity evidence under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109 (prior sexual offenses and domestic violence), the court reaffirmed People v. Falsetta's holding that such admission does not violate due process when subject to careful balancing under Section 352. It found the trial court did not abuse its discretion, having painstakingly reviewed each uncharged act for probative value (considering remoteness, similarity, certainty, and the victim's death) against the danger of undue prejudice, excluding several potentially inflammatory acts. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Baker raped Palmer, citing DNA evidence, Baker's admission, and the circumstances of Palmer's disappearance and discovery. Regarding the felony-murder rule, the court confirmed that for cases preceding People v. Farley, the Wilson merger doctrine does not apply to a burglary predicated on an intent to commit sexual assault (rape, sodomy, or sexual penetration by foreign object) because these acts represent an independent felonious purpose separate from merely assaultive conduct. Finally, the court upheld the parole revocation fine based on People v. Brasure, finding it applicable due to determinate sentences imposed alongside the death sentence, and ordered a correction for a clerical error in the abstract of judgment regarding sodomy convictions.
Concurring - Justice Liu
Justice Liu concurred with the judgment, agreeing to reject the defendant's Batson/Wheeler claims. However, Justice Liu reiterated a previous concern with the existing precedent, which allows appellate courts to assume the trial court made a 'sincere and reasoned effort' in evaluating a prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes, even without an explicit, detailed record of that analysis. Justice Liu believes the better rule would require the trial court to affirmatively demonstrate such an effort on the record to facilitate meaningful appellate review. Nevertheless, Justice Liu stated that even upon an independent review of the record, the prosecutor's reasons for striking the jurors were not shown to be pretextual.
Analysis:
This case reinforces several key evidentiary and procedural principles in California capital cases. It solidifies the constitutionality of admitting propensity evidence in sexual assault and domestic violence cases under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109, underscoring the vital role of the trial court's Section 352 balancing discretion in safeguarding due process. The ruling also clarifies the continued (though limited) applicability of the Wilson merger doctrine for pre-Farley cases, definitively stating that intent to commit sexual assault felonies (rape, sodomy, sexual penetration by foreign object) constitutes an independent felonious purpose for felony murder. Furthermore, it resolves a potential conflict in case law by reaffirming People v. Brasure regarding the imposition of parole revocation fines even for death-sentenced defendants who also receive determinate sentences.
