People v. Babbitt
248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 45 Cal.3d 660, 755 P.2d 253 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A jury instruction creating a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who acted as if he were conscious was in fact conscious does not violate the Due Process Clause. Consciousness is not an element of a criminal offense, but rather an affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the burden of raising a reasonable doubt.
Facts:
- On the evening of December 18, 1980, after consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, Manuel Pina Babbitt broke into the apartment of Leah Schendel, a 78-year-old woman.
- Babbitt ransacked Schendel's apartment, severely beat her, and left her nude from the waist down with a tea kettle placed on her pubic area.
- Schendel died from a heart attack induced by the severe beating and psychological stress.
- Babbitt's fingerprints and palmprints were found on the tea kettle and other items in the apartment.
- The following evening, December 19, 1980, Babbitt attacked Mavis W. as she was getting out of her car.
- Babbitt dragged Mavis W. behind bushes, beat her unconscious, attempted to pull off her pants, and stole her money and jewelry.
- Babbitt asserted that due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from his service in Vietnam and possible psychomotor epilepsy, he was unconscious during the attacks and had no memory of them.
Procedural Posture:
- Manuel Pina Babbitt was charged in a California superior court (trial court) with first-degree murder, robbery, and attempted rape of Leah Schendel, as well as robbery and attempted rape of Mavis W.
- The jury convicted Babbitt on all counts and found true the special circumstances that the murder occurred during a burglary, robbery, and rape.
- At the sanity phase of the trial, the jury found that Babbitt was sane at the time of the offenses.
- At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict imposing the sentence of death.
- The case came before the Supreme Court of California on an automatic appeal from the death sentence.
- Babbitt also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court consolidated with the direct appeal.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction creating a rebuttable presumption that a defendant who acted as if he were conscious was in fact conscious (CALJIC No. 4.31) violate the Due Process Clause by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to negate an element of the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Panelli, J.
No. A jury instruction creating a rebuttable presumption of consciousness does not violate the Due Process Clause because consciousness is not an element of the charged offenses. Under California's statutory scheme, unconsciousness is an affirmative defense, and while the state assumes the burden of disproving it once the issue is raised, this does not transform consciousness into an element of the crime. The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does not require the prosecution to disprove every affirmative defense. The instruction did not impermissibly shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant; it merely required him to raise a reasonable doubt as to his consciousness. When viewed in the context of the entire jury charge, which included instructions on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof, a reasonable juror would not have understood the instruction as relieving the prosecution of its burden.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the constitutional limits on using presumptions in criminal cases, particularly for defenses that negate an element of the crime. The court distinguishes consciousness, a general state of being, from specific mental state elements like intent or malice. By classifying unconsciousness as an affirmative defense rather than making consciousness an element of the crime, the court upholds the use of jury instructions like CALJIC No. 4.31. This ruling affirms the state's ability to create procedural rules that place a burden of production on the defendant for certain defenses, so long as the ultimate burden of proving all elements of the offense remains with the prosecution.
