1. Yes, he's to blame for the crash. Starting a crazy chase like that makes it possible that police will get frantic and make a mistake. A helicopter crash is very unusual, but it's not a completely unbelievable, freak accident that nobody could ever imagine happening. 2. No, it's not murder. To be guilty of murder, Acosta's driving needed to create a 'high risk of death' for the people in the helicopters. His driving was dangerous for people on the road, but it didn't really make a helicopter crash highly probable. There's no proof he was thinking about the risk to the helicopters, so he didn't have the 'conscious disregard for life' needed for a murder charge.

1. Yes, he's to blame. I agree that a crash was a foreseeable result of the chase. It doesn't matter if the crash was in the air or on the ground. 2. Yes, it is murder. Acosta's driving showed he didn't care if *anyone* died, on the ground or in the air. That 'don't care' attitude is enough for murder. The law doesn't require us to prove he was thinking about the helicopter pilots specifically.

1. No, he's not to blame at all. The helicopter pilots weren't in the 'danger zone' created by the car chase on the ground. The crash was a complete fluke caused by pilot error, and it's not fair to hold Acosta responsible for such a bizarre and unforeseeable accident. 2. Since he's not to blame for the crash, he can't be guilty of murder. The main judge's ruling doesn't make sense: if the crash was foreseeable enough to blame Acosta, it should have been foreseeable enough for a murder charge.

Yes, the way Acosta drove caused the crash, and it wasn't something totally unexpected. But he didn't really understand that people could die because of his driving, so he wasn't super mean on purpose.

Doesn't agree with the main decision about whether Acosta was really mean on purpose and thinks the decision to say he's guilty should stay as it is.

Doesn't agree that Acosta's driving on the ground could be blamed for something that happened in the air with the helicopters, because it wasn't something you'd expect to happen.

1. Yes. The defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of the deaths because the result was not highly extraordinary. Acosta's flight was the 'but for' cause and a substantial factor in the deaths. While a midair helicopter collision during a pursuit is rare, the court found it was a possible and not unforeseeable consequence, given that the stress and urgency of a chase create an appreciable probability that a pursuing officer may act negligently. 2. No. The evidence is insufficient to establish implied malice. To prove implied malice, the prosecution must show the defendant committed an act with a 'high probability' it would result in death and acted with a 'conscious disregard' for that risk. Acosta's dangerous driving created a high probability of death for people on the ground, but not for the occupants of the helicopters in the air. There was no evidence Acosta's driving directly affected the flying or that he consciously disregarded a risk to the aerial observers.

1. Yes. The evidence supports the jury's finding of proximate cause. The possibility that pursuing officers might negligently operate their vehicles, whether on the ground or in the air, is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a high-speed chase initiated by a defendant. The fact that the collision involved helicopters instead of cars is a 'distinction without a difference.' 2. Yes. The evidence supports the jury's finding of implied malice. The lead opinion incorrectly adds a requirement that the defendant's act pose a high probability of death to the *specific victims*. The proper standard is whether the defendant acted with conscious disregard for human life in general. Acosta's egregiously dangerous driving over 50 miles demonstrated a sufficient disregard for human life to support a murder conviction for any deaths that were proximately caused by his actions.

1. No. The defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the deaths. The helicopter occupants were not 'within the range of apprehension' or the 'zone of danger' created by Acosta's actions on the ground. The pilot's negligence was an unforeseeable intervening act, and the midair collision was a 'highly extraordinary result' for which the defendant cannot be held criminally liable. 2. He concurs in reversing the murder conviction but does so on the ground of proximate cause, not malice. He argues that the lead opinion's finding of proximate cause is inconsistent with its finding of no malice, as both turn on foreseeability and the extraordinary nature of the event.

Yes, Acosta's conduct was the proximate cause of the deaths because it was a substantial factor in causing the crash, and the result was not highly extraordinary. However, there was insufficient evidence of implied malice because there was no high probability that death would result from Acosta's conduct.

Disagrees with the majority's conclusion on implied malice and believes the judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.

Disagrees with the majority's conclusion on proximate cause, arguing that the helicopter collision was not a foreseeable consequence of Acosta's conduct on the ground.

People v. Acosta

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Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

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Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

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Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

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