Yes. The court decided the little girl was legally 'unavailable.' The judges explained that for a small child, being too scared and upset to talk counts as a temporary 'mental weakness' or 'infirmity.' Kids aren't just small adults; they can't handle super stressful situations the same way. Because she couldn't overcome her fear right then and there, she was 'unavailable,' which means the court can now consider using the story she told at an earlier, smaller court hearing.

Yes, but for a different reason. This judge agreed the girl was unavailable but didn't like calling a healthy four-year-old 'mentally infirm.' He said that word is usually for people who are sick or very old. Instead, he argued that the rulebook's list of reasons a witness can be 'unavailable' isn't a complete list. Since the girl simply couldn't testify, no matter how they tried to help her, she was unavailable for a general, common-sense reason.

Yes. This judge agreed with the main decision and added that other big court cases have already said that the law has to treat kids differently from adults. Because kids think and act differently, it makes sense to have a special rule for a child witness who is too traumatized to speak in court.

No. This judge thought the lower court made the right call and that the girl shouldn't be considered unavailable yet. He felt the trial court gave up too easily and should have tried harder to help the girl testify. He worried that the current court rules aren't really designed for witnesses who are so young and suggested the rules might need to be updated.

Yes, RS can be considered 'unavailable' because she was too upset to talk in court. We think this counts as a 'mental problem' in the rules because RS is so young that she can't handle being so upset like an adult could. Kids' brains are different from adults', and they can't always control their feelings when they're scared or upset. RS was only 4 years old and she was crying and couldn't answer questions, so we think this shows she had a 'mental problem' that made her unavailable. We're sending the case back to the first judge to decide if they can use what RS said earlier.

No, I don't think RS should be called 'unavailable' just because she was upset. I think we should try harder to help kids talk in court before we say they can't do it. This is a tricky situation because we want to protect kids, but we also need to be fair to the people accused of doing bad things. Maybe we need to change our rules to better handle situations with young kids in court.

Yes, RS was unavailable, but not because she had a 'mental problem'. I think she was unavailable because she didn't understand why it's important to tell the truth in court. The judge tried twice to help RS understand, but it didn't work. So, I agree RS was unavailable, but for a different reason than the other judges said.

Yes, I agree with the main decision, but I want to add that it's really important to remember that kids are very different from adults. Other big courts have said that kids' brains work differently, and we need to think about that when we make decisions about kids in court. This is why I think it's okay to say RS had a 'mental problem' that made her unavailable, even though we might not say the same thing about an adult who was upset.

Yes. A young child's inability to testify due to severe emotional distress caused by the limitations of youth constitutes a 'then existing... mental... infirmity' under MRE 804(a)(4), rendering the child unavailable as a witness. The plain meaning of 'infirmity' is weakness, and 'mental infirmity' thus means weakness of the mind, which can be caused by age. The rule specifies a 'then existing' infirmity, meaning the court's only focus is the witness's mental state at the time of trial, not their prior ability to testify. Children lack the mental maturity of adults and are more susceptible to emotional breakdowns under the stress of testifying, especially in a sexual abuse case. RS's visible distress and inability to answer basic questions demonstrated she did not have the mental maturity to overcome her debilitating emotions, which qualifies as a mental infirmity under the rule.

Yes. While the child was unavailable, it was not because of a 'mental infirmity.' The term 'infirmity' relates to weakness from ailment or advanced age, not the normal developmental stage of a healthy four-year-old. However, MRE 804(a) uses the word 'includes,' indicating its list of unavailability scenarios is not exhaustive. The child was found incompetent to testify under MRE 601 because she lacked a 'sense of obligation to testify truthfully.' Because good-faith efforts to qualify her as a witness failed, she was genuinely 'unavailable' under a general, unlisted principle of unavailability that is of the same character as the enumerated situations.

Yes. The majority's holding is supported by a doctrinal foundation that the criminal law must recognize the unique characteristics of children. Citing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence like *Roper v. Simmons* and *Miller v. Alabama*, this opinion argues that children are constitutionally and fundamentally different from adults. This principle, though developed in the context of juvenile sentencing, is relevant here because it underscores that a child's developmental limitations and inability to cope with the emotional trauma of testifying must be viewed through a different lens than an adult's, justifying the finding of a 'then existing mental infirmity'.

No. The Court of Appeals should be affirmed. While finding Justice Markman's argument that the child's condition is not an 'infirmity' to be persuasive, this opinion disagrees with the ultimate result reached by both the majority and concurrence. Given the importance of live, public testimony, more rigorous attempts should have been made to secure the child's testimony before declaring her unavailable. The existing rule of evidence may be ill-suited for the unique situation of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases and should be reexamined.

Yes. I hold that RS is unavailable under MRE 804(a)(4) because her severe emotional distress, exacerbated by her young age, constitutes a 'then existing mental infirmity.' The plain language of MRE 804(a)(4) encompasses weakness or feebleness of the mind, which can be caused by an individual's age. Children lack the same level of mental maturity as adults and are less mentally equipped to cope with severe emotional distress. RS, at only 4 years old, was unable to overcome her debilitating emotions while on the stand, demonstrating a mental infirmity. This interpretation recognizes the unique psychological and developmental traits of children in legal determinations of witness availability. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that RS was not unavailable, as it made a legal error in interpreting MRE 804(a)(4). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court to determine if RS's preliminary examination testimony satisfies MRE 804(b)(1) and if its admission would violate the Confrontation Clause.

No. I dissent because I agree with Justice Markman that RS cannot properly be categorized as suffering from an infirmity in this case. However, I also disagree with Justice Markman's conclusion that RS was unavailable under a general principle of unavailability in MRE 804(a). Given the importance of unavailability in hearsay exceptions and the value our legal system places on public testimony, more rigorous attempts should have been made before declaring RS unavailable. This case illustrates the tension in applying evidence rules to child witnesses in sexual abuse cases, balancing protection of vulnerable citizens against the need to protect the accused from erroneous conviction. Our existing rule of evidence may not have been drafted with these unique issues in mind, and we should consider reexamining our rule on unavailability, as other jurisdictions have done.

Yes, RS was unavailable, but not due to a 'mental infirmity' under MRE 804(a)(4). Instead, I would hold that RS was unavailable under the general principle of unavailability in MRE 804(a). The use of 'includes' in MRE 804(a) indicates the list of five situations is not exhaustive. RS was found incompetent to testify under MRE 601 because she lacked a 'sense of obligation to testify truthfully and understandably,' not due to insufficient mental capacity. Two good-faith efforts to qualify RS as a witness failed. Because RS lacked a sense of obligation to tell the truth and attempts to qualify her failed, she was genuinely 'unavailable' under the general principle in MRE 804(a).

Yes, I concur with the majority but write separately to emphasize the doctrinal foundation supporting the recognition that children are qualitatively different from adults in criminal law. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged that children's unique characteristics render them inherently different from adults in various legal contexts. Although these cases primarily involved juvenile offenders, not witnesses, the underlying rationale is relevant here. The Court has recognized that children are constitutionally different from adults in some circumstances and that developments in psychology and brain science show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. This acknowledgment that children are different from adults in criminal law underscores the majority's holding that RS's inability to testify due to emotional distress should be seen as a 'mental infirmity' under MRE 804(a)(4).

People of Michigan v. Stanley G Duncan

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot