People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service
28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
A natural parent who has surrendered a child to an authorized adoption agency retains a superior right to custody until a final adoption decree, and may regain custody if the surrender was improvident and the child's best interests are promoted by returning the child to a fit and capable parent.
Facts:
- In the summer of 1969, Olga Scarpetta, an unmarried 32-year-old woman, became pregnant in her native Colombia by a married Colombian man.
- Seeking to minimize the shame of an out-of-wedlock child, Miss Scarpetta came to New York for the purpose of having her child.
- On May 18, 1970, Miss Scarpetta gave birth to an infant child.
- Four days after the birth, she placed the infant for boarding care with Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, an agency authorized by statute to receive children for adoption.
- Ten days later, Miss Scarpetta executed a surrender document to the agency.
- On June 18, 1970, the agency placed the baby with a family for adoption.
- Five days later, on June 23, 1970, Miss Scarpetta repented her actions and requested that the child be returned to her after her family in Colombia assured her of their support.
Procedural Posture:
- Olga Scarpetta commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in Special Term (trial court) to regain custody of her child from Spence-Chapin Adoption Service.
- Special Term concluded that the child should be returned to Olga Scarpetta.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Special Term's decision.
- The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does a natural mother who has surrendered her child to an authorized adoption agency have the right to regain custody of the child prior to a final adoption, and if so, under what conditions, and may prospective adoptive parents intervene in such a proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Jasen, J.
Yes, a natural mother who has surrendered her child to an authorized adoption agency may regain custody of the child prior to a final adoption if the surrender was improvident and the child's best interests are promoted by returning the child to a fit, competent, and able parent. No, prospective adoptive parents may not intervene as a matter of right. The court held that a surrender executed by a mother to an authorized agency in New York (Social Services Law, § 384) is not irrevocable and remains subject to judicial supervision until an actual adoption or the agency has met specific statutory requirements. Surrender documents are seen as unilateral acts, not contracts, often executed under emotional circumstances that may cast doubt on their voluntariness or understanding of consequences, thus requiring judicial oversight. However, surrenders should only be undone for the 'weightiest reasons.' The court's power to change custody back to the parent is exercised only when 'the interest of such child will be promoted thereby and that such parent is fit, competent and able to duly maintain, support and educate such child' (Social Services Law, § 383, subd. 1). The court reaffirmed the 'primacy of parental rights,' stating that a natural parent has a right to custody superior to all others, unless proven unfit or having abandoned that right (citing People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky). The burden is on the non-parent (the agency) to establish parental unfitness and that the child’s welfare compels custody with the non-parent, not merely that the non-parent offers superior material advantages. The court found that the record supported the lower courts' finding that the surrender was improvident and that the child's best interests would be served by returning her to Miss Scarpetta, who quickly sought her return, was motivated by concern, had stabilized her life, was well-educated, financially secure, and found fit. Regarding intervention, the court ruled that prospective adoptive parents are not entitled to intervene as a matter of right. Public policy in New York is against disclosing the identities of natural and prospective adoptive parents, which intervention would breach. The agency acts as an 'insulating intermediary' according to the statutory scheme (Social Services Law §§ 383, 384). Denying intervention did not violate due process for prospective adoptive parents, as they did not have legal custody (the agency did) and had no vested rights in the child prior to a final adoption decree.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the strong legal presumption in favor of natural parental rights in New York, even after a surrender to an authorized agency, prior to a final adoption. It clarifies that such surrenders are not irrevocable and remain subject to judicial review under a 'best interests of the child' standard, heavily weighted by parental primacy. The ruling also firmly establishes that prospective adoptive parents do not have a right to intervene in such proceedings, preserving anonymity and preventing vested rights before adoption is finalized. This emphasizes the distinction between temporary placement and legal adoption, and places a high bar for non-parents to overcome a natural parent's claim to custody.
