Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.
18 How. 421, 59 U.S. 421, 15 L. Ed. 435 (1856)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under its power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress may declare a structure that obstructs a navigable waterway to be a lawful structure, thereby superseding a prior judicial decree ordering the abatement of that structure as a public nuisance.
Facts:
- The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, under the authority of a Virginia state law, constructed a suspension bridge across the Ohio River at Wheeling.
- The State of Pennsylvania had invested heavily in a system of canals and railroads that connected with the Ohio River, relying on it for commerce.
- The bridge was constructed at an elevation too low to permit the safe passage of certain large steamboats, particularly passenger packets, that navigated the river to and from Pittsburg.
- To pass under the bridge, these steamboats were required to lower their smokestacks, an operation that caused delays, expense, and danger.
- This interference with river traffic caused special economic damage to the State of Pennsylvania by impeding its trade and commerce.
- After the Supreme Court issued its initial decree, the bridge was destroyed in a gale of wind, and the Bridge Company began efforts to reconstruct it.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Pennsylvania filed a bill in the Supreme Court of the United States, invoking the Court's original jurisdiction, against The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company.
- The Supreme Court investigated the complaint and, in May 1852, issued a decree finding the bridge was an unlawful obstruction to navigation and a public nuisance causing special injury to Pennsylvania.
- The decree ordered the Bridge Company to either elevate the bridge to a specified height or remove it entirely.
- The decree was later modified, allowing the company the alternative of constructing a draw in the western portion of the bridge to allow steamboats to pass.
- After the bridge was destroyed by a storm and the company began rebuilding it to its original, non-compliant height, Pennsylvania obtained a preliminary injunction from Justice Grier, sitting in vacation, to halt the reconstruction.
- Pennsylvania then filed a motion before the full Supreme Court to enforce the original decree and for an attachment against the Bridge Company for contempt for disobeying the injunction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an act of Congress declaring a bridge that obstructs a navigable river to be a lawful structure and post-road constitute a valid exercise of its power to regulate commerce, thereby superseding a prior Supreme Court decree ordering the abatement of the bridge as a public nuisance?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Nelson
Yes. The act of Congress is a valid exercise of its power to regulate commerce, which supersedes the Court's prior executory decree. The Court's original decree was founded on the bridge being an unlawful obstruction to navigation under existing federal law. However, Congress possesses the supreme power to regulate commerce, which includes navigation and the authority to determine what constitutes a legal obstruction. The subsequent Act of Congress, declaring the bridge a lawful structure, effectively modified the public right of navigation. While the bridge may still be an obstruction in fact, it is no longer one in the contemplation of law. Although Congress cannot annul a final judgment that has established vested private rights (such as an award of damages), a decree to abate a public nuisance is executory and prospective. Since the underlying law has been changed by a competent authority, the legal basis for the abatement order is removed, and the decree cannot be enforced.
Dissenting - Justice McLean
No. The act of Congress is an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power and a violation of the Port Preference Clause. The Court, through a proper judicial investigation, determined as a matter of fact that the bridge was a nuisance. Congress cannot alter a fact or reverse a judicial finding by legislative fiat; to do so is to act judicially, which violates the separation of powers. Furthermore, the act gives a direct preference to the ports of Wheeling over the port of Pittsburg by requiring upriver vessels to modify their chimneys to pass the bridge, imposing a significant financial burden and delay on Pittsburg's commerce. This action directly contravenes the constitutional prohibition in Article I, Section 9, that 'no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another.'
Concurring - Justice Grier
No. This opinion concurs with Justice McLean's dissent that Congress cannot validly annul or vacate a decree of the Supreme Court. The assumption of such a power by the legislature is without precedent and sets a dangerous example for the future. The opinion also disagrees with the majority's decision to deny the motion for contempt, believing the company should be punished for its wanton contempt of the court's process. However, the author concurs with the majority only on the procedural point that a single justice may award an interlocutory injunction in vacation.
Concurring - Justice Wayne
No. This opinion dissents from the majority's holding that the act of Congress relieves the defendants from the Court's judgment. The author argues that Congress has no power to interfere with a judicial judgment for the abatement of a nuisance under the guise of regulating commerce or establishing post-roads. If the act of Congress is interpreted to legalize the bridge and override the Court's decree, then the act is unconstitutional. The author concurs with the majority only on the defendants' liability for costs and that an attachment for contempt should have been granted.
Concurring - Justice Daniel
Yes, the injunction should be dissolved, but for different reasons. This opinion concurs in the judgment to dissolve the injunction and refuse the coercive measures, but argues that the entire case, from its inception, was procedurally and jurisdictionally flawed. The author contends that the act of Congress was a completely valid exercise of its constitutional power to regulate commerce on the Ohio River. Congress acted wisely and justly by balancing river commerce with the essential need for a land-based transit over the river. By enacting this statute, Congress completely overthrew any foundation upon which the Court's prior decrees and the subsequent injunction could rest.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant precedent regarding the supremacy of Congress's Commerce Clause power over conflicting judicial decrees concerning public rights. It clarifies that while Congress cannot retroactively nullify final judgments on vested private rights, it can change the underlying public law, thereby rendering executory decrees like injunctions unenforceable. This holding grants Congress broad authority to define and regulate interstate commerce, including legalizing structures previously found by courts to be unlawful obstructions. The case marks a key moment in the delineation of power between the legislative and judicial branches concerning the regulation of the national economy and infrastructure.
