Pennsylvania Exchange Bank v. United States
145 Ct. Cl. 216, 170 F.Supp. 629 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
An assignment for the benefit of creditors that renders a party incapable of performing its future obligations constitutes a total anticipatory breach of an entire, indivisible contract.
Facts:
- The U.S. Army Signal Corps initiated an "Industrial Preparedness Contracts" program to ensure manufacturers were ready to produce essential components in a national emergency.
- On February 29, 1952, Joseph Lerner & Son, Inc. (Lerner) entered into such a contract with the government to be prepared to manufacture "Microwave Magic Tees."
- The contract required Lerner to complete preparatory "Steps I, II, and III," which involved research, planning, and acquiring tooling, for which the government provided payment.
- Upon completion of the preparatory steps, Lerner was obligated under "Step IV" to remain able and ready to begin volume production if ordered by the government at any time during a six-year period.
- By October 1, 1953, Lerner had substantially performed Steps I, II, and III of the contract.
- On October 1, 1953, due to insolvency, Lerner made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of its creditors to The Pennsylvania Exchange Bank and Samuel H. Roseman, disabling it from performing its future standby obligations.
Procedural Posture:
- The Pennsylvania Exchange Bank and Samuel H. Roseman, as assignees for Joseph Lerner & Son, Inc., sued the United States in the U.S. Court of Claims.
- The plaintiffs sought to recover the unpaid balance due under the contract.
- The defendant, the United States, asserted two counterclaims for damages, alleging plaintiff committed a total breach of the contract.
- The case came before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties and on the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims.
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Issue:
Does a government contractor's assignment for the benefit of creditors constitute an anticipatory breach of an entire, indivisible contract where the assignment renders the contractor incapable of performing its future standby obligations?
Opinions:
Majority - Whitaker, Judge
Yes, the assignment for the benefit of creditors constitutes an anticipatory breach of the entire contract. The court reasoned that the contract was not divisible; Steps I, II, and III were merely incidental to the ultimate objective of Step IV, which was to have a manufacturer ready and able to produce goods in a national emergency. The duty to stand by for six years was the essential element of the bargain. When Lerner's insolvency and subsequent assignment made it incapable of performing this future duty, the entire purpose of the contract was thwarted. Citing Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, the court affirmed the principle that it is an implied condition in every contract that a promisor will not permit itself, through insolvency or bankruptcy, to become disabled from performing. The government's payments for the preparatory steps constituted consideration for Lerner's promise to stand ready, and Lerner's inability to do so resulted in a total breach, making it liable for damages.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle that insolvency, manifested by an assignment for the benefit of creditors, can operate as an anticipatory repudiation of a contract. It emphasizes that in determining whether a contract is entire or divisible, courts will look to the ultimate purpose of the agreement, treating preliminary stages as incidental if they solely serve a final, essential objective. The decision establishes a strong precedent for government contracts and other long-term agreements where a party's continuing viability and readiness to perform is a core component of the bargain. Future cases involving multi-stage contracts will likely analyze whether a party's financial incapacitation thwarts the fundamental purpose of the agreement, potentially triggering a total breach even if initial stages were properly completed.

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