Penhollow v. BD. OF COMMISSIONERS CECIL COUNTY
116 Md. App. 265, 1997 Md. App. LEXIS 115, 695 A.2d 1268 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not impose individual liability on supervisory employees, but an employer may be sued even if not explicitly named in an EEOC charge if an "identity of interest" exists. For a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, offensive conduct must be of a sexual nature, distinct from general gender discrimination, while local governments can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of constitutional rights caused by official policy or custom, including policymaker inaction despite knowledge of discrimination.
Facts:
- Monica Penhollow was employed as a correctional officer at the Cecil County Detention Center since 1985, attaining the rank of Corporal in 1987.
- In May 1994, Penhollow received an interim evaluation that Sergeant Anna Husfelt was ordered by Jeffrey Clewer to lower, and male supervisors did not receive such evaluations.
- When Penhollow was called for grand jury duty from January to May 1994, supervisors (Sergeant Lannen, Jeffrey Clewer, George Haggerty) called the trial court judge regarding a conflict of interest, a practice not followed for male employees.
- In September 1994, Penhollow was not treated as the senior ranking corporal and was assigned to the control area while Corporal James Christopher, a junior, was assigned to booking, placing him in a supervisory position.
- In August 1993, Corporal James Christopher referred to Penhollow as "She’s a fucking bitch" and "She’s got the brain the size of a pea" in front of other employees, and Penhollow's repeated complaints about his attitude and comments toward female employees went unaddressed.
- In January 1993, Sergeant James Russell used foul and abusive language towards Penhollow in front of subordinates, and despite her verbal complaints to Sergeant Husfelt and Jeffrey Clewer, no further investigation or follow-up occurred.
- From 1990-1993, Penhollow was transferred to various evening and midnight shifts, frequently required to work back-to-back, while Corporal James Christopher worked exclusively day shifts and no overtime.
- Penhollow was wrongfully disciplined twice (October 1992 and October 1991) for incidents she was not responsible for, resulting in suspensions and probation, and experienced difficulty receiving reimbursement for wrongful discipline pay compared to a male corporal.
Procedural Posture:
- Monica Penhollow filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Cecil County against the Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County and several individual employees, alleging five counts: Title VII violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations, negligent hiring or retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
- The appellees filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as to Counts I (Title VII) and II (§ 1983), and motions for summary judgment as to Counts III (negligent hiring/retention), IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and V (Maryland Declaration of Rights).
- The Circuit Court for Cecil County granted the appellees' various motions, dismissing the Title VII claim against individual employees and against Cecil County (due to failure to name it in the EEOC complaint), dismissing the § 1983 claim against all parties, and granting summary judgment on the remaining claims (Counts III, IV, and V).
- Monica Penhollow appealed the Circuit Court's judgment to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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Issue:
1. Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 impose individual liability on supervisory employees? 2. Can an employer be sued under Title VII if it was not explicitly named in the EEOC charge, but an "identity of interest" exists with a named entity? 3. Does a claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment under Title VII require the offensive conduct to be of a sexual nature, or is gender-based disparate treatment sufficient? 4. Can a local government be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a supervisor's discriminatory conduct based on an official policy or custom, even if that policy is inferred from the policymakers' inaction despite knowledge of discrimination? 5. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment on negligent hiring/retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims given the facts alleged?
Opinions:
Majority - Cathell, Judge
1. No, Title VII does not impose individual liability on supervisory employees. The term "agent" in the statutory definition of "employer" is incorporated to establish respondeat superior liability for the employer, not to hold individuals personally liable. This interpretation is consistent with Congress's intent to protect small entities from the costs of litigating discrimination claims, and it would be illogical to protect small employers but not individual employees. Traditional tort remedies are deemed sufficient to redress harm to individual victims by individual employees. 2. Yes, the Title VII action was properly filed against Cecil County despite not being specifically named in the EEOC charge, due to the "identity of interest" exception. There is a clear similarity of interests between Cecil County and the Sheriff's Department (funded by the county, employees governed by county policies), the County had notice of the EEOC charges, and there was little prejudice to the County. 3. No, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the "hostile environment" sexual harassment aspect of the Title VII claim. For conduct to constitute sexual harassment, it must be of a "sexual nature," as defined by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson. While the remark "I don’t need you in here. Go sit in booking and look nice" may be gender-relevant, it was not perceived to be of a sufficiently "sexual" nature to meet this standard. However, Penhollow did make sufficient allegations of gender discrimination based on disparate treatment to defeat summary judgment. 4. Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claim as to all appellees. Penhollow sufficiently alleged inaction on the part of Sheriff Kennedy and the Board of County Commissioners, who are official policymakers, despite their alleged knowledge of gender discrimination. This inaction could allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the local government's "actual policies were different from the ones that had been announced," thereby establishing municipal liability under § 1983 under the Monell standard. 5. No, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on both the negligent hiring/retention claim and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. For negligent hiring/retention, Penhollow failed to allege sufficient facts to establish malice, which is required to overcome governmental immunity. Furthermore, Cecil County did not have the authority to hire or retain the Sheriff's employees, who are considered state officials under Maryland law for these purposes. For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the conduct alleged by Penhollow did not meet Maryland's high "extreme and outrageous" standard, lacking the special relationship, physical manifestation, or awareness of a fragile emotional state present in prior successful cases.
Analysis:
This case clarifies several key areas of employment discrimination law. It aligns Maryland with the majority federal view, insulating individual supervisors from Title VII liability while preserving employer liability. The ruling on the "identity of interest" exception for EEOC naming ensures that substantive claims are not defeated by minor procedural omissions when notice and lack of prejudice are evident. Critically, it narrows the scope of "sexual harassment" under Title VII to require conduct of a sexual nature, distinguishing it from broader "gender discrimination" (disparate treatment) claims. Furthermore, the court's interpretation of § 1983 municipal liability expands accountability for local governments by recognizing that policymaker inaction, despite knowledge of discrimination, can constitute an "official policy or custom," providing a pathway for plaintiffs to overcome the high bar of proving a direct municipal policy. Finally, the case reinforces the stringent requirements for proving intentional infliction of emotional distress and overcoming governmental immunity for negligent hiring/retention in Maryland.
