Pedro Amezquita v. Rafael Hernandez Colon
1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 5616, 518 F.2d 8 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Individuals who illegally occupy government land and construct structures upon it do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment nor a protected property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, thereby eliminating any constitutional requirement for prior judicial authorization before eviction or destruction of their structures by the governmental landowner.
Facts:
- Sometime before January 18, 1974, a group of squatters occupied a portion of a farm owned by the Land Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and established a community known as Villa Pangóla.
- Officials from Commonwealth agencies visited Villa Pangóla on two occasions prior to April 2, 1974, attempting to persuade the community members to leave voluntarily.
- On April 2, 1974, officials from the Housing Department and the Land Authority, assisted by members of the Police Department, conducted a 'cleaning' operation at Villa Pangóla, using two bulldozers to destroy structures identified as uninhabited.
- Under Puerto Rico law, anyone who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on another's land loses what they have built without any right to indemnity (31 L.P.R.A. § 1165).
- Puerto Rico law also grants the landowner the right to demand demolition of structures or removal of plantings made in bad faith, at the expense of the person who built them (31 L.P.R.A. § 1166).
- The squatters' occupancy of the land was criminal under Puerto Rico law (33 L.P.R.A. § 1442).
Procedural Posture:
- Sometime after January 18, 1974, the Land Authority of Puerto Rico initiated a suit in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, seeking an injunction to evict the squatters.
- Members of Villa Pangóla filed a class action in a U.S. federal district court, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including due process, equal protection, and protection against illegal searches and seizures.
- The federal district court certified two classes and issued an opinion ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendants and their agents from destroying plaintiffs' property and invading privacy without first obtaining a judicial order.
- On the same day (July 22, 1974) that the federal district court rendered its opinion, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico issued an order in Land Authority of Puerto Rico v. Rivera, directing the members of Villa Pangóla to evacuate the land and remove their structures.
- The squatters' appeal from the Superior Court's order was dismissed without opinion by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on December 11, 1974.
- The Land Authority appealed the federal district court's injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a squatter community occupying government land illegally have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, or a protected property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, that would necessitate prior judicial authorization before the governmental landowner may evict them and destroy their structures?
Opinions:
Majority - McENTEE, Circuit Judge
No, members of a squatter community occupying government land illegally do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, nor do they possess a protected property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, to require prior judicial authorization for eviction and destruction of structures. The court reasoned, regarding the Fourth Amendment, that protection extends only to situations with a "reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy," as established in Katz v. United States. Since the squatters knew they had no legal right to occupy the Land Authority's property and had been asked to leave twice, any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy was "ludicrous." The court cited cases where hotel guests lose privacy expectations upon rental expiration, concluding that someone who simply "invites himself in" could not create such an expectation. Furthermore, a ruling by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico that the squatters had no right to remain on the property collaterally estopped them from making a privacy claim. The court emphasized that the bad faith occupancy and construction were highly relevant, and having no legal right to occupy the land precludes a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the squatters owned the materials used to build the structures. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the court stated that a protected "liberty" or "property" interest must exist before determining what process is due. The squatters' conduct was criminal under Puerto Rico law, negating any protected "liberty" interest. For a "property" interest, the court looked to Puerto Rico law, specifically 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 1165 and 1166, which state that bad faith builders on another's land lose what they built without indemnity and the landowner can demand demolition. These statutes preclude the recognition of a "property" interest that would necessitate procedural preliminaries. Even if Puerto Rico law required prior judicial approval for self-help eviction (a question the court did not decide), such a hearing would be futile, as it could not have resulted in the plaintiffs being allowed to remain on the land given their illegal occupancy. Procedural protections only define a property right if they amount to a substantive restriction on the ultimate action being challenged, which was not the case here.
Analysis:
This case is critical in defining the scope of constitutional protections for individuals in illegal occupancy. It clarifies that a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth Amendment is deeply intertwined with legitimate claims of occupancy, and mere physical presence or the construction of structures on illegally occupied land does not automatically confer such an expectation. The ruling underscores the essential role of state law in defining "property" interests for the purpose of federal due process claims, particularly in contexts involving trespass or bad-faith occupation. It reinforces the principle that procedural due process is not mandated where there is no underlying protected liberty or property interest, and a hearing would effectively serve no substantive purpose.
