Pears v. State
1983 Alas. App. LEXIS 372, 672 P.2d 903 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant can be convicted of second-degree murder for a homicide caused by driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated if the defendant's conduct manifests an extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Facts:
- Richard Pears drank at a bar to the point of intoxication.
- Pears then drove recklessly, speeding and running stop signs, which frightened his passenger, Kathy Hill.
- After drinking at a second bar, Pears was stopped by two uniformed police officers who explicitly warned him not to drive because he was too intoxicated.
- Pears deceived the officers by walking away until they were out of sight, then returned to his truck and resumed driving.
- Despite protests from his passenger, Pears continued to drive over the speed limit and run red lights.
- After dropping off his passenger, Pears was seen running another red light at high speed, passing cars that were stopped for the light.
- Pears approached a subsequent intersection with a red light, bypassed stopped cars by using the right-turn only lane, and entered the intersection at high speed without braking.
- Pears' vehicle collided with another car, killing two occupants and seriously injuring a third.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Alaska charged Richard Pears with two counts of second-degree murder and one count of second-degree assault in the trial court.
- Pears filed a motion to dismiss the murder indictment, which the trial court denied.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Pears on all three counts.
- The trial court judge sentenced Pears to twenty years for the murder convictions and revoked his driver's license permanently.
- Pears (as appellant) appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals of Alaska (this court).
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Issue:
Does driving a vehicle while intoxicated under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life constitute second-degree murder under Alaska's statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Coats, Judge
Yes. A vehicular homicide can be prosecuted as second-degree murder if the driver's recklessness manifests an extreme indifference to human life. The legislature did not intend to categorically exclude motor vehicle homicides from the scope of the murder statute. The critical distinction between manslaughter and second-degree murder in this context is the degree of recklessness, which is a question for the jury. While manslaughter involves creating a significant risk of death, murder requires a much greater risk that rises to the level of 'extreme indifference to human life.' The evidence of Pears' continuous and escalating reckless driving, especially after being explicitly warned by both his passenger and police officers, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that his conduct met this high standard.
Concurring - Singleton, Judge
Yes. While vehicular homicide can constitute second-degree murder in limited circumstances, this case represents one of those rare instances. A conviction for second-degree murder requires recklessness so extreme that it can be 'assimilated to purpose or knowledge,' meaning the defendant's conduct must approach a practical certainty of causing death or serious physical injury. This case is distinguished from a typical drunk driving homicide by three key factors: (1) Pears was warned by his passenger about his dangerous driving; (2) Pears was explicitly told not to drive by uniformed police officers, whom he then deceived; and (3) he had several near-misses before the fatal collision. These factors collectively elevate his conduct beyond mere recklessness to the level of extreme indifference required for a murder conviction.
Analysis:
This case is significant as it was the first in Alaska to affirm a second-degree murder conviction for a vehicular homicide. It establishes the legal principle that the instrumentality of death (a car versus a gun) is not dispositive; rather, the defendant's mental state and the degree of recklessness determine whether a charge of murder is appropriate. The decision clarifies that while most drunk driving fatalities will be prosecuted as manslaughter, murder charges are permissible in egregious cases where the facts show the defendant acted with an 'extreme indifference to human life.' This precedent provides prosecutors with a basis to seek murder convictions in the most severe vehicular homicide cases, particularly those involving aggravating factors like ignoring direct warnings from law enforcement.
