Payant v. Imobersteg
681 N.Y.S.2d 135, 256 A.D.2d 702, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12980 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A medical expert witness is not required to be a specialist in the same field as the defendant physician, and any alleged deficiencies in the expert's qualifications or experience go to the weight of their testimony for the jury to decide, not to its admissibility.
Facts:
- On June 4, 1990, Peter A. Payant was in a severe motorcycle accident that partially amputated his lower right leg.
- Payant was taken to the emergency room at Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital (CVPH).
- He was treated by Dr. A. Michael Imobersteg, an orthopedic surgeon, who decided to try to salvage the leg rather than immediately amputate.
- The doctors performed vascular surgery and applied an external fixator device to the leg.
- On June 12, 1990, Payant was transferred to a different medical center in Vermont.
- Three days later, on June 15, 1990, an examination revealed a large amount of necrotic muscle in the leg.
- Due to the discovery of dead tissue, doctors had no alternative but to amputate Payant's leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Peter A. Payant and others (plaintiffs) filed a medical malpractice action in the Supreme Court of Clinton County, a trial-level court, against Dr. A. Michael Imobersteg and Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital (CVPH).
- On the eve of trial, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant CVPH, dismissing the complaint against the hospital.
- The case against Dr. Imobersteg proceeded to trial.
- During the trial, the court granted Dr. Imobersteg's motion to preclude the testimony of plaintiffs' two expert medical witnesses.
- Because plaintiffs could not present expert testimony, the trial court granted Dr. Imobersteg's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to establish a prima facie case.
- Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, challenging both the summary judgment for CVPH and the trial court's dismissal of the case against Dr. Imobersteg.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err in precluding medical expert testimony when the expert is not a specialist in the same field as the defendant physician or has not recently practiced in that field?
Opinions:
Majority - White, J.
Yes. A trial court errs by precluding expert testimony based on factors that should go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The court blurred the distinction between a witness's qualifications, which is a matter for the court, and the weight to be given their testimony, which is an issue for the jury. The court reasoned that there is no requirement for a medical expert to be a specialist in the exact same field as the defendant; the fact that expert Neil Crane was an infectious disease specialist and not an orthopedic surgeon could affect the weight of his testimony but did not render it inadmissible. Furthermore, the court held that the so-called "locality rule" should not be invoked to bar testimony about minimum standards of care applicable nationwide. Similarly, the alleged lack of recent surgical experience of the second expert, Howard Balensweig, was a matter of skill and expertise that goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Because the exclusion of these experts prevented the plaintiffs from establishing their case, a new trial is warranted.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that the trial court's gatekeeping function for expert testimony is limited. It clarifies that challenges regarding an expert's specific sub-specialty or recency of practical experience are generally matters for cross-examination and jury determination, not grounds for exclusion. The ruling also signals the continuing erosion of the strict "locality rule" in medical malpractice, acknowledging that national standards of care are increasingly relevant in modern medicine. The decision serves as a significant precedent against trial courts overstepping their role by weighing evidence under the guise of determining admissibility.
