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Paul v. Davis

Supreme Court of United States
424 U.S. 693 (1976)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Defamation by a state official, standing alone, does not constitute a deprivation of a "liberty" or "property" interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a constitutional claim, the defamation must be accompanied by the alteration or extinguishment of a more tangible right or status that is recognized and protected by state law or the Constitution.


Facts:

  • In late 1972, Louisville Police Chief Paul and Jefferson County Police Chief McDaniel collaborated on an effort to alert local merchants to potential shoplifters during the Christmas season.
  • In early December, the police chiefs distributed a five-page flyer to approximately 800 merchants, which was titled "ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS" and contained names and mugshot-style photographs.
  • The flyer included the name and photograph of Edward Charles Davis III.
  • Davis's inclusion was based on his arrest for shoplifting on June 14, 1971.
  • The shoplifting charge against Davis had been "filed away with leave to reinstate" after he pleaded not guilty, and it was ultimately dismissed shortly after the flyer was circulated; his guilt or innocence was never adjudicated.
  • At the time, Davis was employed as a newspaper photographer, and his supervisor confronted him about the flyer, warning him not to be in a similar situation in the future.

Procedural Posture:

  • Edward Charles Davis III filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Police Chiefs Paul and McDaniel in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
  • The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint did not allege a deprivation of any constitutional right.
  • Davis, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, finding that Davis had stated a valid claim for a denial of due process of law.
  • The police chiefs, as petitioners, were granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does a state official's distribution of a flyer identifying an individual as an "active shoplifter," based on a prior arrest that did not result in a conviction, deprive that individual of a "liberty" or "property" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Rehnquist

No. Injury to reputation alone, apart from the alteration of a more tangible interest, is not a deprivation of "liberty" or "property" sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be converted into a "font of tort law" to be superimposed on state systems. It distinguished prior cases, such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau, by reinterpreting them to require not just a stigma to one's reputation, but a "stigma-plus" an alteration of a right or status previously recognized under state law, such as the right to purchase alcohol or hold government employment. Because Kentucky law does not grant a legal guarantee to the enjoyment of reputation that was altered by the police chiefs' actions, Davis's claim is merely a state-law defamation tort, not a federal constitutional violation under § 1983.


Dissenting - Justice Brennan

Yes. An individual's interest in their good name and reputation is a core "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and the government may not officially brand an individual as a criminal without the safeguards of a trial. The majority's holding allows government officials to arbitrarily inflict punishment by stigmatization, rendering the presumption of innocence a sham. Brennan argued that the Court misread precedent, which consistently held that official branding of an individual implicates constitutional liberty interests. He warned that the new "stigma-plus" requirement is an artificial distinction that creates a frightening potential for abuse of official power, allowing the government to condemn individuals outside the judicial process so long as no other tangible right is taken.



Analysis:

Paul v. Davis significantly narrowed the scope of "liberty" interests protected by the procedural Due Process Clause by establishing the "stigma-plus" test. This decision makes it substantially more difficult for individuals to bring federal civil rights claims under § 1983 based solely on reputational harm caused by government actors. The ruling effectively diverts many such claims from federal court back to state tort law, reflecting a broader judicial philosophy of limiting the expansion of constitutional torts and preserving traditional state-federal boundaries. The "stigma-plus" framework has since become the controlling standard for analyzing due process claims involving government defamation.

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