Patton v. J. C. Penney Co.
719 P.2d 854, 301 Or. 117 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
An employer generally may discharge an at-will employee for any reason unless it violates a contractual, statutory, or constitutional requirement, or a recognized public policy exception. The tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress requires conduct that constitutes an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct,' which is not met by merely unpleasant or unfair termination of an at-will employee.
Facts:
- J. C. Penney Co. hired David Patton in 1969, and he worked as a merchandising manager in Portland from 1980.
- In 1981, store manager McKay instructed Patton to end a social relationship with a female co-employee.
- Patton informed McKay that the relationship did not interfere with his work performance, for which he had earned several awards, and he intended to continue seeing the co-employee on his own time.
- McKay made statements to other employees, while interrogating them, indicating that Patton needed to discontinue the relationship to keep his job, despite the absence of a written or unwritten policy prohibiting such fraternization.
- In late 1981, McKay warned Patton that his job performance was unsatisfactory and that he would be fired without improvement; Patton's subsequent request for a transfer was denied.
- In February 1982, McKay terminated Patton's employment for unsatisfactory job performance, a decision approved by district manager Chapin.
Procedural Posture:
- David Patton filed suit against J. C. Penney Co., McKay, and Chapin in the trial court (court of first instance), alleging 'wrongful discharge' and 'outrageous conduct' (intentional infliction of severe emotional distress).
- The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on both counts.
- Patton appealed to the Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals, with Patton as appellant and J.C. Penney Co. et al. as appellee, affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim, remanding it for trial in the circuit court.
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Issue:
1. Does terminating an at-will employee for engaging in a personal relationship disapproved by a supervisor constitute wrongful discharge, absent a contractual, statutory, or constitutional violation, or a recognized public policy exception? 2. Does terminating an at-will employee for a personal relationship, even if intended to cause and actually causing severe emotional distress, constitute an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct' for the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - jones, j.
No, terminating an at-will employee for a personal relationship disapproved by a supervisor does not constitute wrongful discharge if it does not fall under an established exception. Oregon law adheres to the general rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, unless there is a contractual, statutory, or constitutional requirement to the contrary. The court has recognized exceptions for fulfilling public duties (e.g., jury duty in Nees v. Hocks), refusing to engage in illegal or defamatory acts (e.g., Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l), or pursuing statutory rights related to employment (e.g., resisting sexual harassment in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.). Patton's claim that his "fundamental, inalienable human rights were compromised" blurs rights against governmental infringement with rights against a private employer. His voluntary private acts are not mandated or prohibited by state or federal law, and therefore do not establish an exception to the at-will doctrine. No, terminating an at-will employee for a personal relationship, even if intended to cause and actually causing severe emotional distress, does not constitute an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.' The tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress requires (1) intent to inflict severe mental or emotional distress, (2) actual severe mental or emotional distress, and (3) actions that constitute "some extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct" or exceed "any reasonable limit of social toleration." Even assuming the employer intended to inflict distress and succeeded, the act of discharging an at-will employee, even if for a disapproved private relationship, does not meet the high bar of socially intolerable conduct. The court distinguishes this case from those involving truly abusive and extraordinary means, such as physically violent threats (Brewer v. Erwin), abusive debt collection tactics (Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc.), or coercive interrogation to admit a crime (Hall v. The May Dept. Stores). While McKay's behavior might have been "rude, boorish, tyrannical, churlish and mean," it was not "outrageous in the extreme" sufficient to support the claim.
Concurring_in_part_and_dissenting_in_part - linde, j.
I agree that plaintiff has not pleaded a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge because Oregon law generally treats employment relationships as terminable at will, and a discharge is not a tort simply because a court or jury disapproves of the employer’s reason, unless it contravenes another law or public duty. I also agree that the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim should be dismissed against J. C. Penney Co., Inc., because the complaint does not allege that the managers acted in pursuit of a business purpose of the company when inflicting distress, distinguishing it from cases where an employee acts to further employer objectives. However, I dissent from the dismissal of claims against McKay and Chapin personally. The factual allegations, which include McKay's anger, termination on false grounds of unsatisfactory performance, and actions done "with malice and in retaliation for Plaintiff's assertion of his valued rights and were intended to inflict upon Plaintiff severe emotional distress," are sufficient to plead another tort claim against McKay for tortious interference with Patton's employment contract with J. C. Penney Co., Inc. This claim could arise if McKay misused his power as store manager for personal rather than company purposes. Similarly, if plaintiff can prove the malicious personal motive alleged against Chapin for failing to overrule the dismissal, an interference claim could also lie against Chapin. The complaint should not be dismissed for failing to label the exact legal theory when the facts alleged make out a claim for tort damages.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the at-will employment doctrine in Oregon, limiting exceptions for wrongful discharge to those based on clear public policy, statutory rights, or illegal employer demands, explicitly excluding general 'personal rights' or lifestyle choices. It also sets a high threshold for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claims against employers, clarifying that mere rudeness, arbitrariness, or even malicious conduct in the context of an otherwise lawful termination does not automatically constitute 'outrageous' behavior. This ruling makes it more difficult for employees to challenge dismissals based on personal dislike or subjective unfairness, underscoring the legal distinction between an employer's lawful right to terminate and truly egregious, tortious conduct in the workplace.
