Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
491 U.S. 164 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because the statute's protection of the right to 'make and enforce contracts' does not extend to conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations. A claim for discriminatory failure to promote is actionable under § 1981 only if the promotion represents an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer.
Facts:
- Brenda Patterson, a black woman, began working for McLean Credit Union in May 1972 as a teller and file coordinator.
- Over the course of her ten-year employment, Patterson's supervisor allegedly subjected her to various forms of racial harassment.
- The alleged harassment included the supervisor staring at her for extended periods, assigning her an excessive workload, and giving her demeaning tasks like sweeping and dusting, which were not assigned to white employees.
- The supervisor allegedly told Patterson that black people are known to work slower than white people.
- Patterson was allegedly denied training and was passed over for a promotion to an intermediate accounting clerk position, which was instead given to a white employee.
- Patterson was laid off from her job in July 1982.
Procedural Posture:
- Brenda Patterson sued McLean Credit Union in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- The District Court ruled that a claim for racial harassment is not actionable under § 1981 and refused to submit that portion of the case to the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of McLean Credit Union on Patterson's claims of discriminatory discharge and failure to promote.
- Patterson (appellant) appealed the District Court's rulings to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that racial harassment is not cognizable under § 1981's protection of the right to make and enforce contracts.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision on the harassment and promotion claims.
- After initial oral argument, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to brief and re-argue the question of whether its prior decision in Runyon v. McCrary should be overruled.
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Issue:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees all persons the same right 'to make and enforce contracts' as is enjoyed by white citizens, prohibit an employer from engaging in racial harassment against an employee after the employment relationship has been established?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No, racial harassment occurring after the formation of an employment contract is not actionable under § 1981. The statute's plain language protects only two rights: the right 'to make' contracts and the right 'to enforce' contracts. The right to 'make' contracts applies only to the formation of a contract, such as a refusal to hire or an offer of a contract on discriminatory terms; it does not extend to post-formation conduct like harassment, which relates to the conditions of employment. The right to 'enforce' contracts protects an individual's access to legal process to resolve contract claims and does not govern an employer's performance under the contract. Such post-formation conduct is more properly addressed by the more expansive and detailed remedial scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To interpret § 1981 more broadly would undermine Title VII's specific procedures for conciliation and resolution.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Yes, § 1981 encompasses claims of racial harassment in employment. The Court’s interpretation is needlessly cramped and ahistorical, ignoring the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which shows Congress intended to protect freedmen from discriminatory working conditions that were vestiges of slavery. When harassment is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive,' it demonstrates that the employer imposed discriminatory terms and did not allow the employee to make a contract on an equal basis. The majority’s deference to Title VII is misplaced, as Congress intended for Title VII and § 1981 to be independent, overlapping remedies for discrimination.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Stevens
Yes, an employee's right to protection from racial harassment is encompassed within the right 'to make and enforce contracts.' A contract is not a static document but an ongoing relationship, especially for an at-will employee who is constantly 'remaking' that contract. When an employer implements a policy of harassment against black employees, it imposes a discriminatory contractual term on them that is not the 'same' as the contractual relationship 'enjoyed by white citizens.' This conduct constitutes manifest discrimination in the making of contracts as that concept has been previously interpreted by the Court.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of § 1981, limiting its application to conduct at the point of contract formation and enforcement. By excluding post-formation conduct like harassment, the Court effectively channeled such claims to Title VII, which has stricter procedural requirements and, at the time, offered less comprehensive remedies. The creation of the 'new and distinct relation' test for promotion claims added a layer of complexity for plaintiffs. This controversial interpretation was a primary catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which legislatively overruled the holding, explicitly amending § 1981 to include the 'performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.'
