Patten v. Ardis
304 Ga. 140 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that permits a court to grant grandparent visitation over the objection of a fit parent based solely on a 'best interests of the child' standard, without requiring clear and convincing evidence that denying visitation would cause harm to the child, unconstitutionally infringes upon the parent's fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their child under the Georgia Constitution.
Facts:
- In 2015, Robert Shaughnessy and Katie Patten married and conceived a child.
- Shaughnessy died soon after the marriage.
- In November 2015, the widowed Patten gave birth to a daughter.
- Patten initially permitted Shaughnessy's mother, Mary Jo Ardis, to visit the baby on a couple of occasions.
- Following these visits, which reportedly did not go well, Patten decided to deny further visitation between Ardis and the child.
- In November 2016, Ardis sought court-ordered visitation with her granddaughter.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Jo Ardis filed a petition for grandparent visitation in the Superior Court of Lowndes County against her daughter-in-law, Katie Patten.
- Patten filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the statute authorizing the visitation, OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), was unconstitutional.
- The trial court denied Patten's motion, held that the statute was constitutional, and granted Ardis's petition for visitation after finding it was in the child's best interests.
- Patten, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's order directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
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Issue:
Does Georgia statute OCGA § 19-7-3 (d), which allows a court to award visitation to a grandparent over a fit parent's objection if the other parent is deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated, based on a 'best interests of the child' standard, violate the parent's fundamental constitutional right to raise their child without undue state interference?
Opinions:
Majority - Blackwell, J.
Yes. OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) unconstitutionally impairs a parent's fundamental right to raise their child under the Georgia Constitution. The court's reasoning relies heavily on its precedent in Brooks v. Parkerson, which established that the state may only interfere with a fit parent's right to control the upbringing of their child upon a showing of harm to the child. The statute at issue, like the one in Brooks, allows a judge to substitute their own judgment for that of a parent based on a vague 'best interests of the child' standard, which is constitutionally insufficient. The court reasoned that state interference with parental rights is permissible only where the health or welfare of a child is threatened, and this threat must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The fact that OCGA § 19-7-3 (d) applies only in limited circumstances (death, incapacity, or incarceration of a parent) does not cure its constitutional defect, as harm to the child cannot be presumed in these situations. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional because it does not require a showing of harm before authorizing state interference with a parent's decision.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and strengthens the 'harm standard' established in Brooks v. Parkerson as the constitutional prerequisite for court-ordered, third-party visitation against a fit parent's wishes in Georgia. It clarifies that even narrowly tailored statutes aimed at specific circumstances, such as the death of a parent, cannot circumvent this high threshold. The ruling significantly bolsters parental autonomy, making it more difficult for grandparents and other third parties to obtain visitation by requiring them to prove that the parent's decision is actively harming the child, rather than merely arguing that visitation would be beneficial or desirable. This precedent solidifies the protection of parental rights against state intrusion based on a judge's subjective determination of a child's 'best interests.'
