Patchak v. Zinke (Patchak II)
138 S. Ct. 897 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that strips federal courts of jurisdiction over a specific class of cases, even a very narrow class relating to a single subject matter and applicable to a pending lawsuit, constitutes a permissible change in the law under Congress's legislative power and does not violate Article III by impermissibly infringing on the judicial power.
Facts:
- The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Band) identified a 147-acre parcel of land in Wayland, Michigan, known as the Bradley Property, where it wanted to build a casino.
- In 2005, the Secretary of the Interior announced the decision to take the Bradley Property into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act.
- David Patchak, a nearby landowner, opposed the casino, believing it would harm the area's rural character.
- In January 2009, the Secretary of the Interior formally took the Bradley Property into trust.
- The Band opened its casino on the property in February 2011.
- While Patchak’s lawsuit challenging the Secretary’s authority was pending on remand, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act in 2014.
- Section 2(a) of the Act reaffirmed the Bradley Property as trust land, and Section 2(b) ordered that any action relating to the land 'shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.'
Procedural Posture:
- David Patchak sued the Secretary of the Interior in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the Secretary's authority to take the Bradley Property into trust.
- The District Court dismissed the suit, finding it was barred by sovereign immunity and that Patchak lacked standing.
- Patchak (appellee) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which reversed the dismissal.
- The Secretary and the Band (petitioners) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
- In Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak (2012), the Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit, holding that sovereign immunity was waived and Patchak had standing, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
- On remand, the District Court dismissed Patchak's suit, ruling that the newly enacted Gun Lake Act stripped it of jurisdiction.
- Patchak (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's dismissal, holding the Act was constitutional.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act violates Article III.
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Issue:
Does Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act, which directs federal courts to dismiss all pending and future actions relating to a specific parcel of land, violate Article III by impermissibly infringing on the judicial power?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Thomas
No. Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not violate Article III because it is a valid exercise of Congress's legislative power to change the law. The crucial distinction is that Congress violates Article III when it compels findings under old law, but not when it changes the law. Here, Congress changed the law by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over a class of cases—those 'relating to' the Bradley Property. Statutes that strip jurisdiction are a valid exercise of Congress's constitutional authority to constitute inferior courts and regulate their jurisdiction. The Act did not direct a result under the old law; it created a new law—the absence of federal jurisdiction—which the courts were then bound to apply to the pending case.
Concurring in judgment - Justice Ginsburg
No. The Gun Lake Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to control the government's sovereign immunity. The Administrative Procedure Act had waived sovereign immunity, allowing Patchak's suit to proceed initially. The Gun Lake Act effectively retracted that waiver of consent to be sued specifically for actions relating to the Bradley Property. Because Congress has the power to withdraw its consent to be sued at any time, even in pending litigation, the statute is a valid restoration of sovereign immunity, and the dismissal of Patchak's suit was therefore proper.
Concurring in judgment - Justice Sotomayor
No. The Gun Lake Act should be read not as stripping jurisdiction but as restoring the Federal Government's sovereign immunity from Patchak's suit. This reading is the most natural one given the history of the case, which previously turned on whether sovereign immunity had been waived. Interpreting the Act as a restoration of sovereign immunity avoids the serious separation-of-powers concerns raised by a jurisdiction-stripping statute that targets a single pending case.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes. The Gun Lake Act violates Article III by exercising the judicial power. Congress cannot dictate the outcome of a single pending case. Section 2(b) is not a general change in law but is functionally equivalent to a statute declaring 'in the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.' By targeting a specific lawsuit, leaving no other judicial forum for the claim, and directing its dismissal, Congress arrogated the judicial function to itself. Manipulating jurisdiction as a 'means to an end' to decide a particular case passes the limit separating the legislative from the judicial power.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces Congress's broad authority to enact specific, retroactive legislation affecting pending civil cases, as long as it is framed as a change in the underlying law rather than a direct command for a specific result. The plurality's reasoning narrows the scope of the precedent in United States v. Klein, suggesting that even a statute targeting a single pending case can survive an Article III challenge if it is structured as a valid exercise of another legislative power, such as altering federal court jurisdiction. The case highlights a deep division on the Court about the functional limits of Congress's power to intervene in specific, ongoing litigation, with the dissent arguing that such targeted action is a direct usurpation of the judicial role regardless of its form.
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