Parmalee v. Morris
188 N.W. 330, 218 Mich. 625, 38 A.L.R. 1180 (1922)
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Rule of Law:
A racially restrictive covenant in a deed that prohibits the occupancy of a property by a person of a specific race does not violate the 13th or 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because those amendments apply to state action, not private agreements. Such private covenants are not considered void as against public policy and are therefore enforceable.
Facts:
- The Ferry Farm Addition to the city of Pontiac was platted with uniform restrictions applicable to all lots.
- One of the restrictions stated: 'Said lot shall not be occupied by a colored person'.
- Plaintiffs were existing owners of lots within the Ferry Farm Addition subdivision.
- Defendant Morris and his wife, Anna Morris, who are 'colored,' entered into a contract to purchase a lot within the subdivision.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, owners of lots in the Ferry Farm Addition, filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court (trial court) to restrain the defendants, Morris and Anna Morris, from occupying a lot in the subdivision.
- The trial court issued a temporary injunction against the defendants.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing the restriction was unconstitutional and against public policy.
- The circuit court judge denied the motion to dismiss and issued a permanent injunction, modified to prohibit only the occupancy of the property by a 'colored person.'
- The defendants (appellants) appealed the trial court's decree to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
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Issue:
Does a restrictive covenant in a real estate deed that prohibits the occupancy of the property by a 'colored person' violate the 13th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution or contravene public policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
No. A restrictive covenant prohibiting the occupancy of property by a person of a certain race does not violate the U.S. Constitution or public policy. The court, adopting the reasoning of the lower court, held that the 13th and 14th Amendments apply only to state action, not the actions of private individuals creating covenants. The restriction arises from a private agreement, not a legislative act. Furthermore, the court found no state interest that would be harmed by allowing a property owner to place restrictions on who can occupy their land, concluding that such a covenant is not contrary to public policy. The court reasoned that property owners have the right to impose restrictions on the use of their land, provided those restrictions are reasonable and not against public policy. Citing precedents like the Civil Rights Cases, the court affirmed that the Constitution prohibits state-sponsored discrimination, not 'individual invasion of individual rights.' The court also distinguished this case, which involved a restriction on occupancy, from cases where restrictions on the sale of property were invalidated as unlawful restraints on alienation.
Analysis:
This case exemplifies the 'state action' doctrine as it was understood in the early 20th century, which narrowly interpreted the 14th Amendment to apply only to government actions, thereby permitting judicially enforceable private racial discrimination. The decision distinguishes between restrictions on sale (often voided as a restraint on alienation) and restrictions on occupancy, which it upholds as a valid exercise of private property rights. This ruling contributed to the legal framework that allowed for widespread residential segregation through private covenants until the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), which held that judicial enforcement of such covenants itself constitutes state action and violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
