Parker v. Parker
2005 WL 3179971, 916 So. 2d 926 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A former spouse's misrepresentation of a child's paternity during a dissolution of marriage proceeding constitutes intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud, and thus any action to set aside a paternity determination and resulting child support obligation on this basis must be brought within one year of the final judgment.
Facts:
- Richard Parker and Margaret Parker were married on June 26, 1996.
- A child was born during the marriage on June 10, 1998.
- Margaret Parker represented to Richard Parker that he was the child's biological father, and he had no reason to believe otherwise.
- On December 5, 2001, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement, based on the wife's representation of paternity, which obligated Richard Parker to pay child support.
- On March 28, 2003, more than a year after the divorce, Margaret Parker filed a motion to enforce the child support obligation.
- One week later, Richard Parker arranged for a DNA test which excluded him as the child's biological father.
- Richard Parker alleged that Margaret Parker knew he was not the father at all times due to sexual relations she had with another man.
Procedural Posture:
- The parties' marriage was dissolved by a final judgment in a Florida trial court on December 7, 2001, which incorporated their marital settlement agreement.
- More than one year later, Richard Parker filed an independent action in a Florida trial court seeking relief from his child support obligation based on fraud.
- The trial court granted Margaret Parker's motion to dismiss the petition with prejudice.
- Richard Parker, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. Margaret Parker is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a former wife's misrepresentation of a child's paternity during a dissolution of marriage proceeding constitute extrinsic fraud, allowing a former husband to challenge the paternity determination and child support obligation more than one year after the final judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Taylor, J.
No, a former wife's misrepresentation of a child's paternity during a dissolution proceeding is intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud, and does not provide a basis for relief from judgment after one year. The court distinguished between intrinsic fraud, which pertains to issues that could have been tried in the case (like false testimony), and extrinsic fraud, which prevents a party from participating in the case. Paternity is an issue that could have been contested during the original dissolution proceeding. Since Richard Parker was not prevented from litigating the issue at that time, Margaret Parker's misrepresentation constitutes intrinsic fraud. Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), a motion to set aside a judgment for intrinsic fraud must be filed within one year. Because the former husband filed his action more than a year after the dissolution decree, his claim is time-barred. The court explicitly disagreed with prior Florida case law holding otherwise and aligned itself with the majority of jurisdictions, which prioritize the finality of judgments and the child's interest in stability over a belated challenge to paternity.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strict distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in the context of post-dissolution paternity challenges in Florida. It establishes a firm one-year statute of limitations for challenging paternity based on misrepresentation, effectively creating a 'test now, or forever hold your peace' standard for divorcing fathers. The ruling signals that courts will prioritize the finality of judgments and the stability of the parent-child relationship, even if it results in a non-biological father remaining legally and financially responsible for a child. This precedent significantly limits the ability of individuals to unwind paternity determinations years after a divorce, even with conclusive DNA evidence.
