Pardo v. State
596 So. 2d 665 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A child victim's reliable hearsay statements, admissible under Florida Statute § 90.803(23), are not automatically excluded as prior consistent statements merely because the child testifies fully at trial. However, the admissibility of such statements is still subject to the balancing test of Florida Statute § 90.403, which weighs the evidence's probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Facts:
- James Antonio Pardo was charged with seven counts of capital sexual battery.
- The alleged victim was a seven-year-old child.
- The child made out-of-court statements to nine separate individuals describing the alleged abuse.
- The State intended for the child to testify fully concerning all elements of the alleged crimes at trial.
Procedural Posture:
- James Antonio Pardo was charged with capital sexual battery in a Florida trial court.
- The State filed notices of intent to rely on hearsay statements made by the child victim to nine individuals, pursuant to § 90.803(23).
- After a hearing, the trial court found statements made to three of the witnesses were sufficiently reliable for admission under the statute.
- However, citing the Fifth District's decision in Kopko v. State, the trial court ordered the hearsay statements excluded because the child was able to testify fully, making them inadmissible prior consistent statements.
- The State appealed the trial court's order to the Third District Court of Appeal.
- The Third District Court of Appeal quashed the trial court's order, disagreeing with the Kopko decision.
- The Third District certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida due to its great public importance and its conflict with the Fifth District's decision in Kopko.
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Issue:
Does Florida Statute § 90.803(23) permit the admission of a child victim's reliable out-of-court statements even if the child testifies fully at trial and the statements would otherwise be inadmissible as prior consistent statements?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barkett
Yes. A child victim's hearsay statement that qualifies for the statutory exception in section 90.803(23) is admissible even when the child testifies fully at trial, notwithstanding its characterization as a prior consistent statement. The plain language of the statute is unambiguous, as it explicitly provides for admissibility if the child either 'testifies' or 'is unavailable as a witness.' The legislature's intent was to create an exception to both the general hearsay rule and the common law prohibition against prior consistent statements. However, this does not end the inquiry. Such statements, like any other evidence, are still subject to the balancing test in section 90.403, which requires the trial court to exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. This approach properly addresses the legitimate concern that having respected adult witnesses repeat a child's testimony could improperly bolster its credibility, without creating a categorical rule of exclusion that contradicts the statute's plain language.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the interaction between a specific statutory hearsay exception designed to protect child victims and general evidentiary rules. By rejecting a categorical ban on such statements when the child testifies, the court gives effect to the legislative intent behind § 90.803(23). However, by mandating the application of the § 90.403 balancing test, the court provides a crucial safeguard for defendants' rights to a fair trial. This ruling establishes a flexible, case-by-case analysis for trial courts, empowering them to admit corroborative testimony while preventing prosecutors from unfairly 'piling on' evidence in a way that could prejudice the jury.
