Pappas v. Bever
1974 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1057, 219 N.W.2d 720 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A written statement expressing a mere intention to perform an act in the future, such as a pledge to donate money, does not create a legally enforceable promise without additional evidence showing it was intended to be obligatory.
Facts:
- Philip Bissonnette, Jr. executed a printed pledge form for the Charles City College Founder's Fund.
- The form stated, "I/we intend to subscribe to the College Founder’s Fund the sum of Five Thousand —no/100 Dollars."
- The form also stated, "I intend to pay ... Annually over 36 months beginning 1967."
- Bissonnette paid $1,000 on the pledge in 1967 and another $1,000 in 1968.
- Charles City College closed in May 1968.
- Bissonnette made no further payments before his death on May 15, 1969, leaving $3,000 unpaid.
Procedural Posture:
- William Pappas, as receiver for Charles City College, sued Sondra Bever, the executor of Philip Bissonnette, Jr.'s estate, in a state trial court to enforce the pledge.
- The trial court found the pledge was not obligatory and entered a judgment denying its enforcement.
- The plaintiff, William Pappas, appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
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Issue:
Does a pledge form stating that an individual 'intends' to donate a sum of money, without any other evidence of intent, create a legally enforceable promise?
Opinions:
Majority - McCormick, Justice
No. A pledge form stating that an individual 'intends' to donate a sum of money, without more, does not create a legally enforceable promise. When words expressing an intention to do something in the future stand alone, they are not a promise and do not create a legal obligation. The court must ascertain the meaning of the instrument by giving the language its common and ordinary meaning. A mere expression of intention is simply a statement of a state of mind, not a promise put in a form that invites reliance by another person. The fact that Bissonnette made two payments does not convert his statement of intention into a promise; this is a 'bootstrap argument.' Furthermore, if the language were viewed as uncertain, it would be construed against the party who selected it—in this case, the college.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between a statement of future intention and a legally binding promise, particularly in the context of charitable pledges. It establishes that the word 'intend,' without more, is insufficient to create an enforceable contract, placing the onus on charitable organizations to use clear, promissory language (e.g., 'I promise to pay') if they want pledges to be legally binding. This decision protects donors from litigation over what they may perceive as non-binding statements of goodwill. It also reinforces the principle of interpreting ambiguous contractual language against the drafter.
