Pamela Hanna v. Daniel Shea
TO BE PUBLISHED (2025)
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Rule of Law:
KRS 258.235, Kentucky's 'dog-bite' statute, imposes strict liability on a dog owner only for injuries caused by a dog's vicious or mischievous act directed toward a person, such as an attack or bite, and does not extend to injuries from merely tripping over a dog that is peacefully moving.
Facts:
- In June 2020, Pamela Hanna and her boyfriend paid a visit to Daniel Shea and his girlfriend at Shea's home.
- The four individuals were sitting on Shea's front porch, which had limited lighting provided by two oil lamps and possibly nearby garage lights.
- Shea's female Labrador Retriever named Zoe was also on the porch, located at Shea's side.
- Pamela Hanna got up to step off the porch to smoke a cigarette.
- As Hanna walked toward the steps, Zoe may have been startled and got up at the same time, causing Hanna to trip over the dog.
- Pamela Hanna fell as a result of tripping over Zoe and broke her elbow.
Procedural Posture:
- Pamela Hanna filed a lawsuit against Daniel Shea in Marshall Circuit Court, asserting claims for personal injury based on common law negligence and statutory strict liability under KRS 258.235.
- The Marshall Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Daniel Shea, dismissing both the negligence claims (finding no unreasonably dangerous condition) and the strict liability claim (holding the dog's actions were not the type of conduct anticipated by the statute).
- Pamela Hanna, as Appellant, appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her strict liability claim under KRS 258.235(4) to the Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does KRS 258.235, Kentucky's 'dog-bite' statute, impose strict liability on a dog owner for personal injuries sustained when a person trips over the owner's dog, absent any vicious or mischievous act or attack by the dog?
Opinions:
Majority - Easton, Judge
No, KRS 258.235 does not impose strict liability on a dog owner for injuries sustained when a person trips over the owner's dog, as the statute is consistently interpreted to apply only to an attack, bite, or a vicious or mischievous act directed toward a person. The court examined the historical context of Kentucky's 'dog-bite' statutes, noting their consistent interpretation to impose strict liability solely for injuries resulting from some form of attack, which may include a bite, thereby altering the common law 'first bite' rule (citing Maupin v. Tankersley and Koestel v. Cunningham). While KRS 258.235(4) states that an owner whose dog 'caused damage' is responsible, the court emphasized that statutes must be construed as a whole, not by isolated phrases, to ascertain legislative intent (citing County of Harlan v. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc.). The court rejected an interpretation that would lead to 'absurd or unreasonable result[s]' (citing Kentucky Indus. Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co.), reiterating that the legislature did not intend to impose strict liability under 'any and all circumstances' (citing Dykes v. Alexander). Referencing unpublished cases, the court distinguished situations like slipping on dog excrement (Spalding v. Own Your Home, LLC) or tripping over a passively existing dog (Insko v. Perraut), affirming that the statute anticipates some active, vicious, or mischievous conduct from the dog, beyond mere presence or peaceful movement. The court concluded that for strict liability to apply, there must be 'some intentional act which could reasonably be seen as a vicious or mischievous act directed toward the person of the plaintiff,' such as an attack. The court noted that Hanna had abandoned her common law negligence claim, which would have required evidence of the owner's prior knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities, and found no such evidence in the record regarding Zoe.
Analysis:
This case reinforces a narrow interpretation of Kentucky's dog-bite statute (KRS 258.235), limiting strict liability to instances of dog attacks, bites, or other vicious/mischievous acts directed at a person. It clarifies that simply causing an injury by accidental contact or passive presence, even if the dog initiates the movement, is insufficient to trigger strict liability. This decision preserves the distinction between statutory strict liability and common law negligence, where the latter requires proof of the owner's prior knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities. Future cases will continue to evaluate whether a dog's actions constitute a 'vicious or mischievous act,' likely requiring more than an accidental tripping, thus requiring a higher threshold of active, harmful conduct from the dog for strict liability to apply.
