Palmer v. State
1999 Ind. LEXIS 3, 704 N.E.2d 124, 1999 WL 5360 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A person who commits a designated felony is criminally liable for any death that is a foreseeable consequence of their felonious conduct, even if the person killed is a co-felon and the killer is a third party, such as a law enforcement officer, resisting the felony.
Facts:
- Expecting his associate Robert Williams to be arrested on a parole violation, Jesse Palmer accompanied Williams to a parole office.
- When correctional officers attempted to arrest Williams pursuant to a warrant, Williams resisted and tried to escape.
- To aid Williams's escape, Palmer pulled a gun, held it to Officer James Gehrich's head, and threatened to kill him if Williams was not released.
- After the officers released Williams, Williams instructed Palmer to shoot Officer Gehrich.
- Palmer cocked the gun, and as Gehrich grabbed for the barrel, Palmer fired the weapon, shooting Gehrich in the hand.
- In response, another officer fatally shot Williams.
- Palmer then fled the scene.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Indiana charged Jesse Palmer in a state trial court with the felony murder of Robert Williams, kidnapping and attempted murder of Officer James Gehrich, and conspiracy to commit escape.
- The trial court denied Palmer's pro se motion for a continuance made at the commencement of trial.
- The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Palmer guilty of felony murder if Williams was killed as a direct and proximate result of Palmer's participation in the kidnapping.
- A jury found Palmer guilty on all counts.
- Palmer filed a direct appeal of his convictions to the Indiana Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a person commit felony murder under the Indiana murder statute when their accomplice is killed by a law enforcement officer during the commission of a kidnapping initiated by that person?
Opinions:
Majority - Dickson, J.
Yes, a person commits felony murder when their accomplice is killed by a law enforcement officer during the commission of a kidnapping. The Indiana felony murder statute's language, "kills another human being while committing" a designated felony, does not require the felon to be the direct killer. Instead, liability attaches when the felon's conduct is the 'mediate or immediate cause' of the death. By engaging in a kidnapping with a loaded weapon, Palmer created a dangerous situation where it was reasonably foreseeable that resistance from law enforcement could lead to a death. Therefore, he is criminally responsible for the resulting homicide of his co-felon, Williams, because his felonious act proximately caused the death. The State only needs to prove the intent to commit the underlying felony (kidnapping), not a specific intent to kill.
Dissenting-in-part - Sullivan, J.
No, the Indiana murder and accomplice liability statutes do not permit a conviction for felony murder on these facts. The felony murder statute states, 'A person who...kills another human being.' Palmer did not kill Williams; a law enforcement official did. A plain reading of the statute therefore precludes his conviction. Furthermore, accomplice liability does not apply because Palmer's co-perpetrator, Williams, did not commit felony murder, so Palmer could not have aided him in committing that offense. The precedent cited by the majority is distinguishable because those cases involved defendants who inflicted the physical injury that ultimately led to the victim's death, which is not the case here.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the proximate cause theory of felony murder in Indiana, significantly broadening the scope of liability. It holds that a felon can be convicted for a death caused by a third party resisting the felony, so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the felon's actions. This contrasts with the narrower 'agency theory' followed in some jurisdictions, which requires one of the felons to be the actual killer. The ruling means that individuals committing inherently dangerous felonies are responsible for any resulting homicides, including the death of an accomplice at the hands of police, thereby increasing the legal risk of participating in such crimes.
